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MANAGING THE REGULATORY STATE: THE 
EXPERIENCE OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
John D. Graham∗
Paul R. Noe 
 
Elizabeth L. Branch 
The United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an 
organization within the Executive Office of the President, seeks to promote 
wise expenditures, regardless of whether those expenditures are 
made through budgetary programs or through unfunded mandates on states 
or the private sector.  The lion’s share of these unfunded regulatory 
mandates is aimed at businesses, but these rules also impact other entities 
such as state and local governments, unions, colleges and universities, and 
health care providers.1
One of the key roles of OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) is to review new rulemakings and stimulate modernization 
of existing rules.
  
2
 
∗ The views expressed herein solely reflect the personal opinions of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the opinions or positions of the Office of Management and Budget or of 
the U.S. Government.  
  OIRA performs its regulatory oversight with a team of 
  John D. Graham, Ph.D., is Dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School of 
Policy Analysis in Santa Monica, California. From 2001-2006, he served 
as Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 
  Paul R. Noe, J.D., is a Partner with C&M Capitolink and Counsel in the 
law firm of Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.  From 2001-2006, he 
served as Counselor to the Administrator, Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Washington, 
D.C. 
  Elizabeth L. Branch, J.D., is the Special Assistant to the 
Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 
 1. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (OMB), OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY 
AFFAIRS, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS 
AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND 
TRIBAL ENTITIES, 137-81 (2005) [hereinafter OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
 2. OIRA’s authority to oversee new and existing regulations can be found in 
Presidential Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), and the 
Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §624, 114 Stat. 2763. 
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about thirty career OIRA analysts who apply a “soft” benefit-cost test.3  
OIRA asks whether the quantified benefits of a rule exceed the quantified 
costs, but OIRA also strives to be sensitive to important “intangible” 
considerations.  These unquantified factors may reflect basic issues of 
fairness, such as civil rights, or they may reflect a key efficiency concern 
that cannot yet be fully measured and expressed in monetary units (e.g., 
homeland security).  Considering both matters of efficiency and fairness, 
OIRA analysts ask whether a rule has adequate supporting analysis and 
whether the benefits of a rule justify its costs.4
The distinction between budgetary rules and unfunded mandates is 
important.
 
5  The new prescription drug benefit under Medicare was 
authorized by legislation and implemented through rulemaking.6  It is 
considered a budgetary program, however, not an unfunded 
mandate, because the expenditures are paid for by taxpayers through the 
federal government’s Medicare appropriation.  The Department of 
Transportation’s Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, the 
goal of which is to save oil by boosting the fuel economy ratings of cars, 
sport utility vehicles, vans and pick-up trucks, is an unfunded mandate.7
The purpose of this Article is to explain how Presidential management 
of federal regulation, through OMB oversight, has been carried out in the 
first five years of the George W. Bush Administration, during the tenure of 
Dr. John Graham as the Administrator of OIRA.  Part I traces the history of 
Presidential management of the regulatory state.  Part II explores the 
  
The costs of meeting these federal standards are not paid through the 
federal appropriations process; they are presumably incurred by consumers, 
investors and employees in the motor vehicle industry.  This Article 
focuses on unfunded mandates on the private sector. 
 
 3. OIRA has an additional twenty career OIRA analysts who work on statistical and 
information policy.  These analysts also assist in regulatory reviews and reviews of 
administrative (paperwork) burdens under the Paperwork Reduction Act. 
 4. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“Each 
agency . . . shall propose a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits 
of the intended regulation justify its costs.”). 
 5. Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Congress recognized two types 
of unfunded mandates: “federal intergovernmental mandates” and “federal private sector 
mandates.”  2 U.S.C. §§ 658 (5), (7) (2000).  The Act imposes special requirements on both 
Congress and the executive branch before these unfunded mandates may be imposed.  Id. § 
1501. 
 6. See Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066; 70 Fed. Reg. 4193 (Jan. 28, 2005). 
 7. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2006) (average fuel economy standards for passenger 
automobiles); Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 
71 Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006). 
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concept of “smart regulations,” and the associated emphasis on rigorous 
benefit-cost analysis, that Dr. Graham implemented as OIRA 
Administrator.  Part III summarizes the various critiques that have been 
offered against the “smart regulation” approach, and addresses those 
arguments.  Part IV explores future challenges in regulatory policy. 
I. PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE REGULATORY STATE 
Every President from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush has embraced 
centralized executive oversight of agency regulations.8  Even critics of 
OMB acknowledge the legitimacy of a centralized oversight function.9
 
 8. See James Blumstein, Presidential Administration and Administrative Law: 
Regulatory Review By the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy 
Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 854-55 (2001) (“[C]entralized presidential 
regulatory review has now taken center stage as an institutionalized part of the modern 
American presidency.”).  For a more detailed and skeptical account of the evolution of 
centralized OMB oversight under Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan, see Robert V. 
Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 128-55 (1991); see also Michael Herz, 
Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 219 
(1993) (with every President since Nixon, there have been “increasingly systematic efforts 
to gain control of the federal bureaucracy”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2283 (2001) (examining the “presidentialization of administration—
the emergence of enhanced methods of presidential control over the regulatory state”); 
William F. West, The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review: Organizational Stability 
and Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 76, 76-78 (2005) 
(“Modern Presidents have often found centralized forms of management to be appealing” 
and regulatory review “is consistent with this thesis.”). 
  
 9. See Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way 
to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1986) (acknowledging that OMB can 
perform useful functions in coordinating disputes between agencies about rules and assuring 
that relevant scientific and economic information is shared between agencies; that agencies 
consider public comments submitted during the rulemaking process; and that agencies 
consider whether a rule is necessary and lawful).  Elena Kagan has argued that “statutory 
delegation to an executive agency official . . . usually should be read as allowing the 
President to assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated discretion.”  
Kagan, supra note 8, at 2251.  But see Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President 
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 118 (1994) (“The framers did not 
constitutionalize presidential control over all that is now considered executive.”); Morrison, 
supra, at 1059 (over the last decade, as OMB’s role in the issuance of regulations has 
increased, questions have arisen as to the “legality and desirability of OMB’s role.”); Erik 
Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of 
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 1, 12 (1984) [hereinafter Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power] (“OMB Review of 
EPA rules raises constitutional, statutory, and policy concerns.”); Peter L. Strauss, 
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 984 (1997) (stating that the President 
“disserves the democracy he leads when he behaves as if rulemakings were his 
rulemakings”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Myth of the Unitary Executive, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 
299, 299, 306 (1993) (stating that under the Constitution, the President does not have the 
power “to tell an agency what to do,” but as a matter of policy, “there should be presidential 
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Presidents have found regulatory oversight to be necessary and desirable 
because: (i) the regulatory state is a permanent part of the legal landscape 
of the United States; (ii) the economic costs of the regulatory state are 
substantial; (iii) a consensus is needed when executive branch 
disagreements about regulation arise; and (iv) federal regulations are often 
necessary to achieve legislative objectives and implement Presidential 
priorities and policy objectives.10  Virtually all scholarship on this subject 
acknowledges the increasing importance of OMB’s role in regulatory 
policymaking over the past thirty years.11
A. President Nixon 
 
President Nixon initiated efforts to centralize regulatory review in 1971 
through his “Quality of Life” program.  OMB established “a procedure for 
improving the interagency coordination of proposed agency regulations, 
standards, guidelines and similar materials pertaining to environmental 
quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public health and 
safety.”12
 
oversight of the regulatory process”). 
  The Quality of Life program focused on rulemakings that could 
be expected to impact other agencies, impose significant costs or “negative 
benefits” on non-Federal sectors or increase the demand for Federal 
 10. For example, when Congress did not pass President George W. Bush’s Clear Skies 
proposal, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) relied on its existing authority to 
accomplish many of the same results though rulemaking.  See Standards of Performance for 
New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 
28,606 (May 18, 2005); Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and 
Ozone, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005). 
 11. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1986) (“In the 1970s, growing dissatisfaction 
with government regulation led to formal presidential oversight of executive branch 
rulemaking.”); Herz, supra note 8, at 221-22 (starting with President Nixon, there were a 
“series of presidential initiatives to seize control of the federal bureaucracy via OMB”); 
Morrison, supra note 9, at 1059-63 (acknowledging and lamenting the growth of power of 
OMB in regulatory decision making under Nixon, Ford, and Reagan). For a review of the 
documentation of the history of OMB’s regulatory policy, see the web site of The Center for 
Regulatory Effectiveness, http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/centralrev.html. 
 12. The Quality of Life program had its genesis in a memorandum from OMB that was 
first directed to EPA and then to the heads of all of the departments.  See Memorandum 
from George Shultz, OMB Director, to Heads of Departments and Agencies (Oct. 5, 1971), 
available at http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm [hereinafter Schultz 
1971 Memorandum].  Critics of the Quality of Life review process complained that it 
focused primarily, if not exclusively, on EPA rules.  See Herz, supra note 8, at 221 (the 
Quality of Life review was primarily focused on EPA rulemakings); Olson, supra note 9, at 
9 (stating that the Quality of Life review was “nominally applicable to all health and safety 
regulations, but in fact limited almost solely to review of EPA rules”). 
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funding.13  Agencies were required to provide an explanation of the 
principle objectives of the rulemaking, the alternatives that were 
considered, and a comparison of the expected benefits and the costs 
associated with the alternatives.14  OMB managed the interagency review 
process by circulating the proposed rules, gathering comments from other 
agencies, and arbitrating interagency disputes.  The Nixon program served 
as a foundation for later efforts to build a strong, coordinated system of 
regulatory review within the executive branch.15
B. President Ford 
 
In 1974, building on President Nixon’s first steps, President Ford 
established the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) and the 
Review Group on Regulatory Reform to assess the inflationary aspects of 
government actions.16
In that same year, President Ford issued Executive Order 11,821 
(Inflation Impact Statements) which required that “major” regulatory 
proposals “be accompanied by a statement which certifies that the 
inflationary impact of the proposal has been evaluated.”
 
17
 
  OMB was 
directed to develop criteria for identifying rules subject to the Executive 
Order and in so doing to consider the following general categories of 
significant impact: 
a. cost impact on consumers, businesses, markets, or federal, state 
or local government; 
b. effect on productivity of wage earners, businesses or 
government at any level; 
c. effect on competition; 
 
 13. See Schultz 1971 Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1075 (“Modest initial efforts [at formal 
presidential oversight of executive branch rulemaking] begun during the Nixon 
Administration have been strengthened and expanded by each president who followed.”). 
 16. See Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform, 21 REGULATION 20, 20 
(1997). 
 17. See Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1,017 (Jan. 5, 1977) (amending (and 
extending) Executive Order 11,821 and changing the title to “Economic Impact 
Statements”); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 27, 1974); see also 
Christopher C. DeMuth, Constraining Regulatory Costs: The White House Review 
Programs, 4 REGULATION 13 (1980) (“The first serious effort [at controlling regulatory 
costs] was the Inflation (or Economic) Impact Statement program instituted by President 
Ford early in his administration, which required the executive branch agencies to prepare 
evaluations of the expected impact of all major new regulations upon prices, productivity, 
and competition.”). 
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d. effect on supplies of important products or services.18
While OMB had day-to-day responsibilities under the Executive Order, 
its overall involvement was limited; the agencies were responsible for 
ensuring their own compliance.
 
 
19
C. President Carter 
  And while regulatory costs were to be 
considered, stringent analysis was not required of agencies. 
President Jimmy Carter, a former small businessman, surprised some 
with his strong regulatory reform initiatives.20  In 1978, President Carter 
issued an executive order21 that required agencies to conduct a regulatory 
analysis of significant rules22  that would include the economic 
consequences of the various alternatives considered by the agency.23  
Executive Order 12,044 stated that one of its purposes was to ensure that 
regulations “shall not impose unnecessary burdens on the economy, on 
individuals, on public or private organizations, or on State and local 
governments.”24  The Executive Order also directed the agencies to 
conduct a periodic review of existing regulations to ensure that policy 
objectives were being met.25  President Carter also established the 
Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), a cabinet-level entity 
responsible for reviewing the regulatory analyses of a limited number26
 
 18. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. at 41,501. 
 of 
 19. Id. OMB’s review role was also limited because it occurred so late in the rulemaking 
process.  See Percival, supra note 8, at 139 (“[T]he Ford Administration shifted the focus of 
regulatory review away from prepublication review toward review of proposed regulations 
during the public comment period.”). 
 20. See JAMES L. GATTUSO, THE HERITAGE FOUND., REINING IN THE REGULATORS: HOW 
DOES PRESIDENT BUSH MEASURE UP?, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY NO. 1801,  at 4 (2004) 
[hereinafter GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS] (“[T]he Carter Administration spurred 
more regulatory reform than any other Administration before or since” but “there was also a 
substantial increase in the number of new costly regulations imposed by agencies.”); 
Percival, supra note 8, at 142-43 (noting that President Carter surprised some 
environmentalists by being a strong proponent of White House oversight of expensive EPA 
regulations, and crediting the Carter Administration for creating “the most comprehensive 
regulatory review program that had ever been established”). 
 21. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978). 
 22. Significant rules included those that would result in “(a) an annual effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more; or (b) a major increase in costs and prices for individual 
industries, levels of government or geographic regions.”  Id. at 12,663. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 12,664-65.  The Regulatory Flexibility Act also requires such periodic review 
of existing regulations that will have a significant economic impact upon a substantial 
number of small entities.  5 U.S.C. § 610 (2000). 
 26. The Executive Committee of the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG) 
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major regulations, and the new Regulatory Council, responsible for the 
semi-annual Agenda of Regulations established in Executive Order 
12,044.27
Perhaps more importantly,
 
28 in the late 1980s President Carter signed the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act29 and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).30  
The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to analyze and minimize 
regulatory impacts on small businesses.  The PRA, which effects agencies 
intending to create additional paperwork, recordkeeping, or information 
collection burdens on ten or more members of the public, also created 
OIRA within OMB.31
D. President Reagan 
  OIRA serves as the President’s office of regulatory 
expertise and management, as well as overseer of paperwork burdens and 
information policy. 
In his challenge to incumbent President Carter, Ronald Reagan ran on a 
platform of “regulatory relief” for businesses, since the “misery index” 
revealed serious economic problems: double-digit rates of unemployment, 
inflation, and interest.32
 
selected ten to twenty regulatory analyses annually for its review, with no more than four 
from any one agency.  See Memorandum from George Eads, Council of Economic Advisors 
to the Regulatory Analysis Review Group, to participants (Oct. 17, 1979) available at 
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_CounEconAdvMemo101779.PDF.  RARG was chaired 
by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). Its Executive Committee was comprised of 
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), OMB, and two rotating executive branch members, 
one an economic member and one a regulatory member.  The RARG Review Group 
consisted of CEA, OMB, EPA, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the 
Departments of Commerce, Labor, Treasury, Agriculture, Energy, Health Education and 
Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Transportation, and the Interior.  The 
Domestic Policy Staff and the Council on Environmental Quality served as advisors and 
CWPS provided analytical staff support.  RARG could decide to review a regulation for any 
number of reasons, but the main reasons were: (i) large total cost; (ii) large sectoral impact; 
(iii) deficient regulatory analysis; (iv) precedential importance; and/or (v) broad policy 
issues.  Id. 
  The U.S. economy was entering the worst 
 27. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. at 12,661. 
 28. See Percival, supra note 8, at 147 (noting that President Carter signed two laws that 
dramatically increased the economic review of federal regulation, the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act, which was aimed at protecting small businesses from unnecessary regulatory burdens, 
and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), which created OIRA). 
 29. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq (2006). 
 30. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 was signed by President Carter on December 
11, 1980 and took effect on April 1, 1981. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
96-511, 94 Stat. 2812. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See 1988 Republican Party Platform, ALLPOLITICS.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/conventions/republican/features/platform.88 
(defining the misery index during the Carter era). 
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recession since the Great Depression.  During his first days in office, 
President Reagan appointed a new Task Force on Regulatory Relief chaired 
by Vice President George H.W. Bush.33  During the Reagan 
Administration, with the assistance of the newly-created OIRA, the focus 
shifted from agencies policing their own regulations to OMB review and 
oversight.34
On February 17, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12,291 
which revoked Executive Order 12,044.
 
35  Executive Order 12,291 took 
bold steps in the efforts to improve the quality of Federal regulations by 
mandating how and why costs and benefits of regulatory actions36
 
 must be 
considered. It provided that: 
a. Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information 
concerning the need for and consequences of proposed 
government action; 
b. Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential 
benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs 
to society; 
c. Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net 
benefits to society; 
d. Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, 
the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be 
chosen; and 
e. Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of 
 
 33. Blumstein, supra note 8, at 859 (“Because deregulation had been a centerpiece of 
his campaign, President Regan was eager to begin the process.”); Percival, supra note 8, at 
148 (on his first working day in office, President Reagan created a cabinet-level Task Force 
on Regulatory Relief chaired by the Vice President). 
 34. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER: THE 
ROLE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 75-81 (V. Kerry Smith ed., 1984) (examining how 
Executive Order 12,291 “consolidated” OMB’s oversight powers); see also Olson, supra 
note 9, at 5 (“A wide array of powers have made OMB an influential, new omnipresent 
force within the executive branch.”); Percival, supra note 8, at 149-50 (President Reagan 
centralized power in OMB to an “unprecedented degree” and “as a practical matter . . . gave 
OMB enormous power to influence the substance of regulatory decisions.”). 
 35. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 36. See MARLO LEWIS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: 
OPTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, ISSUE ANALYSIS NO. 3 (2005) (“President 
Reagan elevated the role of economics in regulatory oversight.”); DeMuth & Ginsburg, 
supra note 11, at 1075 (earlier regulatory review programs “directed agencies to assess the 
social costs and benefits” of rules; President Reagan’s program directed agencies “to decide 
regulatory questions according to the assessments of costs and benefits”) (emphasis in 
original); West, supra note 8, at 80 (“Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291 required cost-
benefit analysis and centralized review for all (not just major) regulations.”). 
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maximizing the aggregate net benefits to society 37
 
 
Under Executive Order 12,291, an agency had to prepare a Regulatory 
Impact Analysis for every major rule.38 OMB was authorized to designate 
rules as “major” rules39 and review the Regulatory Impact Analyses of the 
major rules.40 Agencies, however, were not permitted to publish these rules 
in the Federal Register until OMB concluded its review.41  The 
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief had oversight over OMB 
actions under Executive Order 12,291.42
The creation of OIRA and President Reagan’s use of his power to curtail 
regulation, however, caused conflict with Congress.
  Thus, President Reagan 
consummated the move to centralize regulatory review and strengthened 
the regulatory analysis requirements. 
43  Critics argued that 
OMB was interfering with the authority of the agencies, working in 
secrecy, and abusing its authority.44  Advocates of strong worker, 
consumer, and environmental protections were especially disturbed.45
 
 37. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193. 
  
 38. Id. at 13,194.  President Reagan’s regulatory review program expanded previous 
efforts by requiring “White House review of virtually all rules.”  DeMuth & Ginsburg, 
supra note 11, at 1075. 
 39. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,196. 
 40. Id. at 13,194. 
 41. Id. at 13,195; see also Percival, supra note 8, at 149 (noting that this Executive 
Order “purported to give OMB the authority to block publication of regulations for an 
indefinite period of time while review was pending”). 
 42. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193. 
 43. Blumstein, supra note 8, at 860 (“But there are often costs to such a striking success, 
and that was the case with the ultimate implementation of the [E]xecutive [O]rder 
[12,291].”). 
44. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note  11, at 1085-86: 
The private nature of the regulatory review process has been both a strength and a 
weakness.  It has been a strength because, like any other deliberative process, it 
can flourish only if the agency head or his delegate, and OMB as the president’s 
delegate, are free to discuss frankly the merits of the regulatory proposal. . . .  The 
necessity to proceed privately has been a weakness only because it has put OMB 
at a disadvantage in responding to allegations that it does, or at least could, act as 
a ‘conduit’ for information or influence to be introduced illicitly into the agency’s 
decision calculus.  These concerns are, however, misplaced. 
See also Morrison, supra note 9, at 1064 (expressing concern that OMB under Reagan 
operated in an “atmosphere of secrecy and insulation from public debate”); Morrison, supra 
note 9, at 1070-71 (stating that changes made by OMB during regulatory review have made 
rules more difficult to defend in court); Olson, supra note 9, at 55 (“OMB long has been 
criticized for the secrecy with which it operates.”); Strauss, supra note 9, at 983 (stating that  
viewing the President, rather than Congress, as “rulemaker” is “disturbing”). 
 45. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1065 (expressing concern that OMB review delays 
issuance of vital health and safety rules while placing interests of industry over public health 
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Numerous reforms of OIRA were proposed.46  In response to these 
concerns, the Reagan Administration agreed to two key OIRA reforms: 
Senate confirmation of the OIRA Administrator,47 and certain public 
disclosures.  To that end, OIRA Administrator Wendy Gramm issued a 
memorandum outlining disclosure procedures for, among other things, 
communications between OIRA and the public, and for certain drafts, 
documents, and correspondence exchanged with the agency.48  Toward the 
end of the Reagan Administration, the first Senate-confirmed OIRA 
Administrator, S. Jay Plager, assumed the leadership of OIRA.49
 
and safety); Percival, supra note 
 
8, at 186-87 (raising concerns that OMB review under 
Reagan was concerned only with costs, and not with benefits). 
 46. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1071-73 (providing that Congress should prevent 
OMB intervention in regulatory matters by amending the Administrative Procedure Act or 
through an appropriations rider; the President should amend the Executive Order to limit 
OMB review to a few major rules each year and to make OMB’s function advisory only; 
OMB should have staff in sufficient numbers with appropriate expertise; OMB 
communications on rulemakings should be publicized; OMB should not be permitted to 
interfere with agency discretion; regulatory review authority should be placed in an office 
separate from the one that determines agency budgets; and OMB, not the agency head, 
should have to elevate its regulatory policy concerns to the President); Olson, supra note 9, 
at 74-79 (providing that courts should ensure that OMB does not usurp the agency’s 
discretion and should require the docketing of OMB contacts with the agency about 
rulemakings; Congress should establish a regulatory review board supervised by the 
President but outside of OMB and statutorily clarify that OMB-agency comments should be 
docketed); Percival, supra note 8, at 203 (noting that there are options for “preventing OMB 
from displacing EPA’s exercise of decision-making authority”; namely, restructuring EPA 
as an independent agency, although it may not be a desirable method of improving agency 
accountability; restructuring regulatory review to restore the primacy of the agency’s role in 
rulemaking; permitting the public to monitor the review process through increased 
disclosures; and transferring OIRA oversight authority to the CEA). 
 47. Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 
1783-335. 
 48. Memorandum from Wendy L. Gramm, OIRA Administrator, to Heads of Dept’s and 
Agencies Subject to Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 on Additional Procedures 
Concerning OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 [Revised] (June 
13, 1986) [hereinafter Gramm Memorandum], reprinted in U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APRIL 1, 1992—
MARCH 31, 1993, at 585 (1993) [hereinafter OMB, 1993 REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE 
UNITED STATES].  The Gramm Memorandum built on an earlier memorandum from Robert 
Bedell, the Deputy Administrator of OIRA, outlining OIRA procedures with respect to 
record maintenance, public access to records, and meetings with the public.  Memorandum 
of Robert P. Bedell, Deputy Administrator of OIRA, to OIRA Staff on OIRA Procedures 
(May 30, 1985), reprinted in OMB, 1993 REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES, 
supra, at 594-97. 
 49. The OIRA Administrators prior to Mr. Plager (July 1988 to Nov. 1989) were James 
Miller (Jan. 1981 to Oct. 1981), Christopher DeMuth (Oct. 1981 to Aug. 1984), Douglas 
Ginsburg (Aug. 1984 to Sept. 1985), and Wendy Gramm (Oct. 1985 to Feb. 1988). 
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E. President George H. W. Bush 
President George H.W. Bush did not have an OIRA Administrator to 
oversee the regulatory process.  The President nominated Professor James 
Blumstein of Vanderbilt Law School to serve in this capacity, but his 
nomination was not considered on the Senate floor due to controversy over 
reauthorization of the Paperwork Reduction Act, despite his being an 
accomplished regulatory scholar.50 Professor Blumstein’s nomination was 
reported out of Committee with approval.51
Early in his Administration, as an analogue to the Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief, President George H. W. Bush created a new structure in 
the Executive Office of the President to serve a similar function—the 
Council on Competitiveness (the Council) run by Vice President Dan 
Quayle.
 
52  The Council assisted OMB with the regulatory review program 
under Executive Order 12,291.53  Under President George H.W. Bush, the 
Council and OMB exercised oversight over a number of major 
rulemakings.54  During his tenure, President Bush also signed several 
statutes which resulted in a large increase in regulatory burden—for 
example, the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.55
 
 50. See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: 
The Case of Presidential Review and Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 167 (1995) (noting 
that OMB review of regulations “got caught in a crossfire” over the reauthorization of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act”). The nomination was not allowed to come to the Senate for a 
vote.  See 136 CONG. REC. 36,321 (1990); Blumstein, supra note 
 
8, at 860-61. 
 51. 136 CONG. REC. 36,320 (1990). 
 52. Percival, supra note 8, at 155 (the Quayle Council on Competitiveness was modeled 
after President Reagan’s Regulatory Relief Task Force). 
 53. LEWIS, supra note 36, at 25; Shane, supra note 50, at 168 (“OIRA lacked an advice-
and-consent appointee to wield its authority over executive agencies,” so “the Council on 
Competitiveness stepped in to fill the political void.”). 
 54. Herz, supra note 8, at 225 (noting that critics of the Council, including 
Representative Henry Waxman, were concerned that the Council was weakening health, 
safety, and environmental regulations, and charged that the Council was “an illegal shadow 
government.”).  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected challenges to both 
President Bush’s Council on Competitiveness and President Reagan’s Presidential Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief.  See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(holding that President Reagan’s Task Force is not subject to the Freedom of Information 
Act); New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting a challenge to an 
EPA rule based on the argument that EPA acted improperly in relying on the opinion of the 
Council on Competitiveness, finding instead that EPA “exercised its expertise”). 
 55. GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that President 
George H. W. Bush’s deregulatory efforts “were overshadowed” by “huge regulatory 
programs” under the Clean Air Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); LEWIS, supra 
note 36, at 25 (stating that in part because the Council on Competitiveness did not have the 
resources to review many rules, and in part because President George H. W. Bush signed the 
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F. President Clinton 
President Clinton appointed Sally Katzen, a Washington attorney, and 
former Chair of the American Bar Association’s Section on Administrative 
Law and Regulatory Practice, to serve as OIRA Administrator.56  On 
September 30, 1993, President Clinton rescinded Executive Order 12,291 
(implemented under Presidents Reagan and Bush) and issued Executive 
Order 12,866 to take its place.57  Under Executive Order 12,866, OMB 
remained the central reviewer of agency regulations58 and, while the Order 
highlighted non-quantifiable effects such as “distributional impact,” 
“equity,” and “qualitative measures,” the importance of a cost-benefit 
analysis was reaffirmed.59  Executive Order 12,866 reduced the scope of 
rules subject to interagency review, from all rules under Executive Order 
12,291 (approximately 2,000 each year) to “significant” regulatory 
actions60 (approximately 500 to 600 each year).  Further, for each 
“significant” regulatory action, as determined by OMB, the agency was 
required to assess both the costs and benefits of the proposed regulatory 
action as well as those of the alternatives that were considered but not 
selected.61  The Executive Order also “restored” the primacy of agency 
authority over regulatory decisions,62
 
Clean Air Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, the total number of pages in the Federal 
Register “shot up”). 
 reaffirmed the public disclosure 
 56. Toward the end of the Clinton Administration, Ms. Katzen (June 1993 to Jan. 1998) 
moved to serve in the White House, and John Spotila (July 1999 to Dec. 2000) became the 
OIRA Administrator. 
 57. Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735. 
 58. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735. The order provides: “The 
Administrator of OIRA shall provide meaningful guidance and oversight so that each 
agency’s regulatory actions are consistent with applicable law, the President’s priorities, and 
the principles set forth in this Executive Order and do not conflict with the policies or 
actions of another agency.”  Id.  
 59. The Order provides that, “in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, 
agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits.”  Id.  It further provides 
that “[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and benefits of the intended regulation and, 
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a 
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs.”  Id. 
 60. A “significant” regulatory action is one that is likely to result in a rule that may have 
an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; create a serious inconsistency, or 
otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; materially alter the 
budgetary impact of entitlements, among other things; or raise novel legal or policy issues 
arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in the 
Executive Order.  Id. 
 61. Id. at 51,737. 
 62. Id. at 51,735; see Shane, supra note 50, at 174 (noting that the Clinton Executive 
Order is “more deferential to policy making by individual agencies”). 
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procedures established by the Gramm Memorandum,63 and added a new 
requirement that OIRA disclose the fact that an agency has formally 
submitted a draft rule to OIRA for review.64  Whether the full strength of 
the Executive Order was implemented under President Clinton has been 
debated.65  In any event, the Administration of President George W. Bush 
has found it to be workable, as discussed below.66
II. OIRA’S “SMART REGULATION” APPROACH DURING THE GEORGE 
W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
 
A. Philosophy 
During the Administration of George W. Bush, OIRA embraced a 
“smart regulation” approach that was neither pro- nor anti-regulation.  
Under this approach, OIRA evaluated the merits of each rulemaking on a 
case-by-case basis using insights from economics, science, engineering, 
and law.  Scholars have argued the merits of such a technocractic approach 
 
 63. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg at 51,737; Gramm Memorandum, supra 
note 48. 
 64. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg at 51737.  By requiring the contemporaneous 
disclosure of the fact that a draft rule has been formally submitted for OIRA review, Exec. 
Order No. 12,866 waived the deliberative process privilege that protects such a disclosure.  
See Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 768, 773-76 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (“Congress adopted Exemption 5 [to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(5) (2006)] because it recognized that the quality of administrative decision-making 
would be seriously undermined if agencies were forced to operate in a fishbowl.”). 
 65. JAMES L. GATTUSO, THE HERITAGE FOUND., REGULATING THE REGULATORS: OIRA’S 
COMEBACK EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM NO. 813 (May 9, 2002) [hereinafter GATTUSO, 
REGULATING THE REGULATORS] (“During the eight years of the Clinton Administration, 
OIRA rarely blocked, or even slowed, proposed regulations.”); GATTUSO, REINING IN THE 
REGULATORS, supra note 20, at 4 (Under President Clinton, “limiting regulatory burdens 
was—for  the first time in two decades—not made a priority.”); Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., 
Promise and Peril: Implementing a Regulatory Budget, 31 POL’Y SCI. 343, 348 (1998) 
[hereinafter Crews, Promise and Peril] (“The aggressive Office of Management and Budget 
regulatory review function maintained by Presidents Reagan and Bush has been scaled back 
by President Clinton.”). 
 66. For a view that a new, stronger Executive Order is needed, see Robert W. Hahn & 
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?  Deeper and 
Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1494-97 (2002) (proposing eight 
innovations over previous Executive Orders, including promoting agency compliance with 
Executive Orders; prompting regulation; considering substitute risks and abstaining from 
regulating trivial problems; explaining rationales for action when benefits do not exceed 
costs; making underlying analyses available; formulating an annual regulatory retrospective 
and regulatory plan, including independent agencies; and authorizing judicial review of 
documents generated as a result of the order) [hereinafter Hahn & Sunstein, A New 
Executive Order]. 
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to regulation.67
OIRA’s “smart regulation” agenda embraces technical and scientific 
expertise.  The President selected one of the authors of this article, Dr. John 
Graham, who had been a faculty member at the Harvard School of Public 
Health for over seventeen years, to serve as OIRA Administrator.
 
68  Dr. 
Graham taught benefit-cost analysis at Harvard where he also created and 
led the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis.  Disproving concerns raised 
during his confirmation process,69
B. The Evolution of OIRA under Administrator Graham 
 under Dr. Graham, OIRA moved toward 
case-by-case assessments, grounded in sound science and benefit-cost 
analysis, with a focus on the well-being of society as a whole. 
What did OIRA and the agencies do during Administrator Graham’s 
tenure to improve the performance of federal regulators?  OIRA made 
progress without doing anything fancy.  OIRA did not seek, nor did it 
receive, any new authority from Congress to reform regulations.  OIRA 
simply implemented the requirements of President Clinton’s 1993 
executive order on regulatory planning and review70
 
 67. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 55-81 (1993) (suggesting a change in administrative review to address the 
problems of risk regulation); RISK, COSTS AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS 
FROM REGULATION 104-34 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) (“Benefit-cost analysis can be an 
extraordinarily valuable tool for policy analysis but it must be reformed.”); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 99-132 (2002) (stating 
that the government should “assess the magnitude of risks”; “examine all the effects of risk 
reduction, including costs and additional hazards created by risk reduction itself”; and 
“explore alternatives to any proposed action”); Robert W. Hahn & Rohit Malik, Is 
Regulation Good For You?, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 893, 905-07 (2004) [hereinafter 
Hahn & Malik, Is Regulation Good for You?] (suggesting ways for OMB to improve the 
economic analyses provided by agencies in support of their regulations); John Morrall, 
Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 221, 229 (2003) (“The 
range of cost-effectiveness among rules continues to be enormous.”); Richard H. Pildes & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 72 (1995) 
(embracing cost-benefit analysis as playing “a useful role in policy analysis” but arguing 
that its inherent flaws warrant modification). 
 and two statutes 
 68. Dr. Graham was confirmed by the Senate on a vote of sixty-one to thirty-seven after 
a spirited debate about the proper role of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory policy.  147 
CONG. REC. S7938 (daily ed. July 19, 2001) (U.S. Senate Roll Call votes).  Dr. Graham 
served as OIRA Administrator from July 2001 to January 2006. 
 69. See Nomination of John D. Graham as Administrator of the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget: Hearing Before the Senate 
Committee On Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 70. President Bush amended Executive Order 12,866 with Executive Order 13,258, 67 
Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 28, 2002).  One of the changes was to shift the responsibility for 
resolving conflicts between agencies, or between an agency and OMB, from the Vice 
President to the Chief of Staff.  Id. at 9386. 
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passed by Congress during the Clinton years: the Regulatory Right to 
Know Act71 and the Information Quality Act.72
OIRA, under Administrator Graham, has done six things: (1) it has 
worked openly; (2) it has buttressed its staffing in science and engineering; 
(3) it has raised the analytic expectations of regulators; (4) it has developed 
a serious, government-wide information quality agenda; (5) it has taken a 
more proactive role in the development and modernization of rules; and (6) 
it has formed strong partnerships with the President’s Council of Economic 
Advisors, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Council on 
Environmental Quality, as well as with the Small Business 
Administration’s Office of Advocacy and the Department of Commerce. 
  
i. Step 1: OIRA does its work openly73
Executive Order 12,866 made the regulatory review process “more 
accessible and open to the public” by codifying disclosure procedures.
  
74
 
 71. See Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624, 114 Stat. 
2763. The Regulatory Right to Know Act directs OMB to quantify annually the costs and 
benefits of federal regulations and prepare a report to Congress on the results of the analysis. 
  
Pursuant to these procedures, when OIRA meets with people who have 
concerns about a rulemaking, these meetings are documented and updated 
daily on OMB’s web site, including basic data on the rule being discussed, 
 72. Information Quality Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515 app. C, 114 Stat. 
2763A-153.  The Information Quality Act amends the Paperwork Reduction Act, and 
attempts to increase the quality and accuracy of information disseminated by the federal 
government. 
 73. For a review of how OIRA has become more transparent since 2001, see U.S. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, STIMULATING 
SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES, 11-13 
(2002) [hereinafter OMB, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS]; GEN. ACCN’G OFFICE (GAO), 
OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE 
REVIEWS 52-58 (2003) [hereinafter GAO, 2003 REGULATORY REVIEW REPORT] (the General 
Accounting Office was renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004).  Some 
critics argue that OIRA’s transparency is insufficient and that OIRA should disclose all 
drafts and communications exchanged by OIRA and the agencies prior to formal submission 
of the rulemaking package.  See Curtis Copeland, Remarks at the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal Symposium on the Contemporary Regulatory State (Feb. 23, 2006).  Transparency, 
however, must be balanced with the deliberative process necessary to open and frank 
communications within the Executive Branch.  See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 
1086 (“The administration’s deliberative process would be significantly compromised if the 
preliminary rounds in any such disagreement [between an agency and OMB] were routinely 
publicized.”  Further, “there are no statutory prohibitions of ex parte contacts by agencies 
engaged in informal rulemaking” and “criticism focusing on ex parte contacts by OMB 
misses the point because communications that remain secret cannot determine the outcome 
of the regulatory process.”). 
 74. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735. 
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and the names and affiliations of the participants.75
This “climate of openness” has helped demystify OIRA’s work, reduced 
concerns previously raised by Congress and reporters during the initial 
years of the formal regulatory review process under Executive Order 
12,291, and freed OIRA’s analysts to do their work instead of responding 
to critics’ process concerns.  While controversy about regulatory policy in 
Washington will always exist, the debate now relates more to substance 
than process. 
  OIRA invites the 
affected agencies to join these meetings but does not disclose minutes of 
these discussions so that the participants can speak candidly.  OIRA does 
disclose any written materials distributed at these meetings.  
ii. Step 2: OIRA buttressed its staffing in science and engineering 
Historically, OIRA staff had strong backgrounds in economics, statistics, 
and policy analysis.76
 
 75. See OIRA Communications With Outside Parties, http://whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/ 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006). 
  The nature of federal regulation, however, has 
changed since OIRA was created in 1981.  Most classic economic 
regulation has been rescinded or is produced by independent agencies 
which are not subject to OIRA regulatory oversight.  The fastest area of 
growth has been public health, safety, and environmental regulation, 
sometimes referred to as science-based or social regulation.  To respond to 
this trend, OIRA hired highly trained experts in fields such as 
environmental science, engineering, epidemiology, toxicology, public 
health, and health policy.  Although the small number of new employees at 
OIRA may seem modest, OIRA’s ability to ask tough questions of 
regulators—and engage in technical dialogue with agency specialists—has  
increased substantially. 
 76. Critics of OIRA have sometimes claimed that OIRA lacks needed technical and 
scientific expertise.  See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1065-66 (expressing concern that OMB 
staff are asking technical questions, even though “virtually all of its reviewing staff are 
economists, lawyers, or public policy analysts, not scientists, pharmacologists, or doctors” 
and “lack the substantive backgrounds to make intelligent judgments”); Olson, supra note 9, 
at 14 (“While OMB oversight is intended to increase the objectivity and rationality of 
decisionmaking, the opposite effect may result due to the Office’s lack of staff and 
inadequate technical expertise.”); Percival, supra note 8, at 181-82 (raising concerns that 
OIRA’s career staff lack scientific and technical expertise on regulatory matters).  In 
countering such criticisms, it has been asserted that “OMB staff is routinely able to ask hard 
questions, both substantive and methodological, to which an agency should be expected to 
have good answers before it proceeds to regulate. . . . The OMB staff is more expert than the 
agencies in one field—the field of regulation itself.”  DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 
1083-84.  Further, OIRA’s recent hires address these criticisms. 
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iii. Step 3: OIRA raised its analytic expectations of agencies 
OIRA began in 2001 by reviving the “return letter.”77  Between July and 
December of 2001, OIRA issued over twenty return letters to agencies, 
suggesting that specific rulemaking proposals need to be reconsidered. 78  
This rate of return, while modest compared to the hundreds of rules 
reviewed, was more than the total number of return letters in eight years of 
the Clinton Administration.79
In an admittedly obscure but readable document called OMB Circular A-
4, OIRA has described—in less than fifty pages—what it expects to see in 
a regulatory analysis.
  Four years later, OIRA rarely needs to issue 
a return letter.  Agencies work with OIRA to fix problems or they persuade 
OIRA that there is no problem to fix.  
80
Circular A-4 prescribes that lifesaving gains from rules are valued in the 
range of $1 million to $10 million per statistical life saved; OMB does not 
pretend to have a more precise answer.
  This guidance document was developed through an 
open process that included public comment, expert peer review, and formal 
interagency review.  The changes in Circular A-4 were 
important refinements, not a revolution.  
81  In other ways, however, the A-4 
guidance is more prescriptive.  Rules projected to have billion-dollar 
impacts must be accompanied by formal, probabilistic uncertainty analysis 
to help clarify when rulemaking decisions should be made promptly, and 
when delay can be justified by improved data and information.82  Health 
and safety rules also must be accompanied by cost-effectiveness analysis 
that accounts for reductions in both mortality and morbidity.83
 
 77. During the course of OIRA’s review of a draft regulation, the Administrator may 
decide to send a letter to the agency that returns the rule for reconsideration. Such a return 
may occur if the quality of the agency’s analyses are inadequate, if the regulatory standards 
adopted are not justified by the analyses, if the rule is not consistent with the regulatory 
principles stated in Executive Order 12,866 or with the President’s policies and priorities, or 
if the rule is not compatible with other Executive Orders or statutes.  See U.S. OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET  (OMB), OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, MAKING SENSE OF 
REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES, 41 (2001) [hereinafter 
OMB, 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
  OIRA 
worked with federal agencies and the Institute of Medicine to define 
common measures of effectiveness, such as the quality-adjusted life year, 
 78. OMB, 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 77, at 41. 
 79. During the last three years of the Clinton Administration, no return letters were 
issued.  Id. at 39-43. 
 80. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. &  BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, CIRCULAR A-4 (2003). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
GRAHAM_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:23 PM 
118 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  [Vol. XXXIII 
that all health and safety agencies can use.84
The air office at EPA has done some work in this area that is 
promising.  Even before the requirements of A-4 took effect, EPA prepared 
a formal probability analysis in support of a new rule that cuts by ninety 
percent the diesel exhaust from off-road engines.  This rule will impose 
several billion dollars per year in compliance costs on refineries and engine 
suppliers, but the probability analysis shows that the agency is more than 
ninety percent certain that the benefits of this rule will exceed the 
costs.
   
85
iv. Step 4: OIRA has developed an “Information-Quality” agenda 
  Formal confidence measurement helps both the agency and the 
public. 
OIRA recognized that the results of regulatory analysis—and policy 
making generally—are only as good as the quality of the input information.  
OIRA did not sanction a process of “garbage in, garbage out,” but instead 
shined a spotlight on information quality (IQ).  OIRA’s new IQ policy 
requires that agencies: (i) develop minimum information-quality standards, 
(ii) utilize peer review prior to the release of official scientific information, 
and (iii) provide a new opportunity for the public to correct information 
that has been disseminated in error.86  The IQ process is still a work in 
progress, but there already exist examples of its potential. 87
 
 84. The Institute of Medicine (IOM), at the request of OMB and several federal agency 
sponsors, developed guidance on conducting cost-effective analyses for regulations.  INST. 
OF MED., VALUING HEALTH FOR REGULATORY COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS (2006), 
available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3809/19739/32029.aspx. 
   
 85. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, FINAL 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NONROAD DIESEL ENGINES (2004), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/nonroad-diesel/2004fr/420r04007.pdf. 
 86. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
INFORMATION QUALITY GUIDELINES (2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/iqg_oct2002.pdf; Memorandum from Dir. Joshua 
B. Bolten to Heads of Dep’ts and Agencies,  Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer 
Review (Dec. 16, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03.pdf. 
 87. For a critique of the implementation of the Information Quality Act, see THOMAS O. 
MCGARITY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, TRUTH AND SCIENCE BETRAYED: 
THE CASE AGAINST THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT, PUBLICATION NO. 502, at 1 (March 
2005) (“Disgruntled industries have used the [Information Quality] Act as an end run 
around well-established procedures for promulgating rules to improve air quality, clean up 
toxic waste sites, and protect children and wildlife from pesticide residues.”); Lisa 
Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration 
Part I, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,297, 10,302 (2004) [hereinafter, A Perfect Storm, Part I] 
(expressing concerns that industries can delay regulation by filing challenges to science 
under the Information Quality Act).  For a response to these criticisms, see OMB, 2005 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 64-66 (noting that agencies have not been 
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v. Step 5: OIRA has taken a more proactive role 
Throughout most of the period of formalized regulatory review under 
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,866, OIRA review occurred at the end of 
the process, after the rulemaking agency had devoted considerable time and 
resources in developing the draft rule. This end-of-the-pipe function allows 
OIRA to have substantial impact with limited resources, but can also result 
in an unfortunate loss of agency time and effort if problems are not 
diagnosed until late in the decision-making process.  Moreover, focusing 
only on the fire “du jour” can neglect systemic problems. 
Early involvement is about getting it right the first time.  This is a 
simple, common sense idea, but it can have profound implications.  In the 
face of world-wide competition, the American business community 
implemented this concept, and revitalized itself.  In the 1980s, this was 
called “Total Quality Management.”  It was based on the work of W. 
Edwards Deming, a former U.S. government statistician who brought a 
commitment to quality to post-war Japan, and similar concepts can be 
applied to the regulatory review process. 88
Under the Bush Administration, OIRA has grappled with this problem 
by using different labels such as performance-based management, or 
managing for results.  OIRA tried to think outside of the old paradigm of 
weeding out bad quality at the end of the line, and instead focusing on 
building good quality into the system from the start.  Deming emphasized 
that quality must be built into the production process, not just inspected for 
at the end; it was the management system, not employees, that was the 
problem.
 
89  Through a series of process reforms detailed below, OIRA 
worked to build quality into the regulatory process, rather than just inspect 
it afterward.90
Under Dr. Graham, OIRA invented a new tool called the “prompt” 
letter—a public letter to an agency suggesting that it should consider 
 
 
overwhelmed with correction requests; the Information Quality Act has been utilized by all 
sectors, not just industry; and OMB is not aware of any evidence that the Information 
Qulaity Act has slowed the regulatory process or chilled agency disseminations). 
 88. See E. Donald Elliott, TQMing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive 
Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 177-79 (1994) (noting that to be effective, quality control must be 
utilized in the early stages, not at the end of the process). 
 89. Id. 
 90. For a criticism of early OMB involvement in EPA rulemakings, see Olson, supra 
note 9, at 47 (“Early OMB involvement compromises EPA’s role as the front-line expert 
decisionmakers in matters entrusted to EPA by Congress.”). 
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adopting a new regulation.91  OIRA has issued roughly a dozen such 
letters, the first one resulting in a new Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) labeling requirement for foods. 92  The food label must now contain 
data on the trans-fat content of foods as well as the saturated fat content. 93
Another notable success with the early involvement strategy was an EPA 
rule on emission from nonroad diesel engines.  OIRA and the Office of 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration collaborated with EPA as 
it developed a final rule on nonroad diesel engines.
  
FDA projects that this rule will produce benefits in heart-disease 
prevention that will pay for the costs of the rule 100-fold. This rulemaking 
was initiated in the Clinton Administration, and finished by FDA at 
OIRA’s request. 
94  By requiring 
dramatic reductions in the sulfur content of fuel, plus new control 
equipment on engines, this rule will cut the diesel exhaust from off-road 
engines used in mining, agriculture, construction, and other off-road 
applications by ninety percent.  As a result of the panel process provided 
for in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
(SBREFA),95
 
 91. For more information on prompt letters, see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html.  For skeptical views of the 
prompt letter, see DAVID M. DRIESEN, CTR. FOR PROGESSIVE REG., IS COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS NEUTRAL? AN ANALYSIS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S APPROACH TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND SAFETY PROTECTION, WHITE PAPER NO. 507, at 13 (2005) 
[hereinafter DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?] (“[N]one of the letters sent to 
agencies protecting safety, public health and the environment urged them to adopt new 
regulations not already underway at the agencies or required by statute.  Nor do the letters 
prompt agencies to adopt more stringent requirements than they were already likely to adopt 
on their own.”); Karen R. Harned & Elizabeth A. Gaudio, OMB Prompt Letters: Are They 
Promoting (Smarter) Regulation?, 6 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 9-11 
(2005) (arguing that prompt letters have “done little to promote agency priority setting” and 
that OIRA should focus its resources on reducing the regulatory burden on small 
businesses).  For a favorable view of prompt letters, see Hahn & Sunstein, A New Executive 
Order, supra note 
 smaller horsepower engines were exempted from some of the 
66, at 1494 (stating that prompt letters ensure that cost-benefit analysis 
will be used “not simply to reduce and limit regulation, but also to spur regulation in those 
cases where it will do more good than harm.”). 
 92. See Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to Hon. Tommy G. 
Thompson, Secretary, Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/hhs_prompt_letter.html. 
 93. Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, 
and Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434-01 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
101). 
 94. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA and OMB Working to Speed the Reduction 
of Pollution From Nonroad Diesel Engines (June 7, 2002), available at 
http://whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/r-117.pdf. 
 95. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612, was amended by the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA).  SBREFA 
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control requirements and small equipment manufacturers received 
flexibility provisions in the final rule.  EPA took a giant step forward in 
improving air quality ($78 billion in net benefits per year when fully 
implemented), but did so without jeopardizing the welfare of small 
equipment manufacturers.96
Through prompt letters and other proactive mechanisms, OIRA and 
federal agencies have worked together to save more lives in a cost-effective 
manner.
 
97
OMB has also undertaken efforts to reform the sea of existing rules.  
Since OMB began to keep records in 1981, federal agencies published 
118,375 new rules in the Federal Register.
 
98  Through 2005, a total of 
20,928 of these rules were considered important enough for OMB review, 
and 1,164 were classified as “major” rules costing over $100 million 
annually, and required to be supported by a regulatory impact analysis.99  
The vast majority of these rules have never been re-examined to 
determine whether they achieved their intended purpose, or what their 
actual costs and benefits were.100
Responding to a statutory requirement to develop “recommendations for 
reform,”
 
101 OIRA launched a public-nomination process in 2001 and 2002 
to identify about 100 rules that agencies are now reforming.102  In 2004, 
OIRA launched a more targeted effort to streamline rules impacting the 
manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy; about seventy-six such rules 
have been targeted by agencies for reform.103
As important as these reviews are, they should be compared to a more 
straightforward approach that was recently used by the Department of 
 
 
requires that an agency convene a review panel prior to issuing the initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis of a regulation, if required.  5 U.S.C. § 609(b). 
 96. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 
Fed. Reg. 38,958 (June 29, 2004). 
 97. Morrall, supra note 67, at 233. 
 98. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS 
AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 26 (2006). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2000).  Section 610 of the 
RFA requires the agencies to review periodically (and within ten years of the publication of 
the final rule) those rules issued by the agency which have or will have a significant 
economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. 
 101. Regulatory Right to Know Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624, 114 Stat. 2763. 
 102. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND 
TRIBAL ENTITIES 150-210 (2004)  [hereinafter OMB, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
 103. OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 117-25. 
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Transportation (DOT) to discard old rules.104  Since large airlines once 
owned the computerized reservation companies, DOT had adopted 
complex rules to protect consumers from deceptive ticketing 
information.105  DOT concluded last year that it was no longer necessary to 
regulate the information provided to consumers of airline tickets.106
vi. Step 6: OIRA formed strong partnerships within the federal 
government 
  The 
computerized reservation companies are now rarely owned by airlines, and 
the Internet has advanced to a point that consumers no longer need 
government assistance to purchase airline tickets.  Importantly, the majority 
of the Computer Reservation System (CRS) rules could be efficiently 
discarded in large measure because of an unusual feature of the original 
rule: a “sunset” provision calling for removal of the regulation unless the 
agency decided affirmatively to retain it.  
OIRA has strengthened its expertise in the review process through strong 
partnerships with several entities within and outside of the Executive 
Office of the President.  The Council of Economic Advisors bolsters 
OIRA’s economic expertise.107  The Office of Science and Technology 
Policy contributes greatly to discussions involving scientific research and 
analysis.108 The Council of Environmental Quality provides support for 
review of environmental regulations.109  The Office of Advocacy within 
the Small Business Administration provides input on small business 
concerns, thereby ensuring that a community greatly impacted by the 
substantial cost of regulations has a strong voice.110
 
 104. Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 976 (Jan. 7, 2004). 
  The Department of 
Commerce provides valuable data and analyses.  With the support of these 
partnerships, OIRA is able to review regulations more efficiently and 
effectively. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. For more information on the Council of Economic Advisors, see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/about.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). 
 108. See http://www.ostp.gov. 
 109. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq. 
 110. See generally U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY (2005), 
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sb_econ2005.pdf (annual report to the 
President regarding small businesses’ performance in the economy); see also Exec. Order 
13,272, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,461 (Aug. 16, 2002) (providing the Office of Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration a formal role in reviewing regulatory analyses). 
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C. Results of “Smarter Regulation” 
Although improving the federal regulatory process has value in its own 
right, it is also important to track how changes in process influence the 
flow of rulemakings and the resulting benefits and costs.  OIRA has 
assembled summary information on federal rules each year since 1981 (the 
year OIRA was created) that satisfy the following criteria: the rule was 
issued by a Cabinet agency or EPA and was projected to have an annual 
economic impact of $100 million per year or more on the private sector or 
state and local governments.  These criteria exclude (1) “budgetary rules” 
where federal appropriations pay for all or much of the rulemaking 
costs; and (2) rulemakings by “independent” agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), that occur without OIRA oversight. In the discussion 
that follows, we refer to rulemakings meeting these criteria as “major 
rules.”  Major rulemakings, which can be of a regulatory or deregulatory 
character, are the primary focus of OIRA’s regulatory oversight activities.   
i. Volume of Major Rules, 1981 - 2004 
During the 1981-2004 period, 234 major rules were issued by federal 
agencies, predominantly the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Department of Transportation, the Department of Labor, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Department of 
Agriculture, and the new Department of Homeland Security.  The volume 
of major-rule activity was not uniform throughout the period.  The number 
of major rulemakings for each administration was: President Reagan (first 
term)—eighteen; President Reagan (second term)—twenty-four; President 
George H. W. Bush—fifty; President Clinton (first term)—thirty-nine; 
President Clinton (second term)—sixty-six; and President George W. Bush 
(first term and beginning of second term)—thirty-seven.111
The $100 million-impact test has not been adjusted for inflation since it 
was established in 1981.
 
112
 
 111. These statistics were compiled from final rules (or regulatory impact analyses that 
were publicly available as part of agency rulemaking dockets) having societal costs and/or 
benefits in excess of $100 million that were published in the Federal Register from 1981 to 
September 2005. As this article was written at the beginning of his second term, the figure 
for President George W. Bush covers only forty-four months. 
  As a result, one would have expected that 
the measured volume of major-rule activity would have increased over this 
period, even if the actual volume of regulatory activity was unchanged, 
 112. The Consumer Price Index increased 108 percent from 1981 to 2004, from 90.9 
to 188.9.  See THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 279, tbl.B-60 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/erpcover2005.pdf. 
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since, as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) grew, more and more 
rulemakings would exceed the $100 million threshold.  Thus, this portrayal 
of rulemakings by year tends to overstate the volume of regulatory activity 
in the recent years relative to the early years.113
While it is interesting to group the major-rule counts by Administration, 
the differences in the counts between Administrations cannot be attributed 
exclusively to factors under a President’s control.  A major rule proposed in 
one Administration may not be finalized until the next Administration.  
Major rules that are mandated by Congress, especially those with statutory 
deadlines or court-ordered deadlines, are not fully within the discretion of 
an Administration.  Even for mandatory rulemakings, Congress often gives 
the President significant leeway in how the rule will be crafted.  Despite 
these qualifications, the major-rule counts are a rough indicator of 
rulemaking activity.  Moreover, since most rulemakings add restrictions 
rather than remove them, the major rule counts are a rough indicator of the 
flow of new restrictions on the private sector and state and local 
governments. 
   
The number of major rules issued is not a performance indicator.  Major 
rules vary enormously in their projected costs and benefits.  Although 
economic efficiency is not the only factor relevant to assessing 
governmental performance, it is useful to track how the projected benefits 
and costs of major rules have changed over time. 
D. Projected Costs of Major Rulemakings, 1981-2004 
From 1981 to 2004, 234 major rules were issued by Cabinet agencies 
and EPA.114  Based on the agencies’ regulatory impact analyses, the 
projected cost of each of these rules was identified and expressed in 
constant 2001 dollars.  The sum of these 234 annualized cost estimates is 
$117 billion per year, accounting for new regulatory costs as well as any 
reductions in regulatory burdens due to deregulation.115 Thus, $117 
billion is an estimate of how much the flow of new rulemakings has added 
to annual regulatory burden in the United States over the last quarter 
century.116
 
 113. In 2005 dollars, a $100 million threshold would pick up rules worth $48 million in 
1981 dollars. 
  This figure, however, does not account for the burdens of the 
stock of existing rules, or rules issued by the “independent” agencies such 
as the SEC and the NRC.  The costs of non-major rules, rules issued by 
 114. See OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 37, fig. 2-1. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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independent agencies, and rules adopted prior to 1981, are not known with 
any precision.  In fact, estimates of the costs of the entire stock of existing 
federal rules range from several hundred billion dollars per year to more 
than a trillion dollars per year.117
The flow of new regulatory costs has not been uniform across 
Administrations.  During President Reagan’s first term, when “regulatory 
relief” was pursued with determination, the burdens of new rules were 
actually less than the burdens removed by deregulatory activity, resulting in 
an average net change in regulatory costs of -$0.2 billion per year for the 
1981-1984 period.
  Even these large figures exclude the 
costs of state and local regulatory actions, some of which may be 
stimulated by federal laws and policies. 
118  Major-rule costs, however, climbed substantially 
during President Reagan’s second term (1985 - 1988) to an average of 
more than $5.2 billion per year—including a surprising $8 billion annually 
averaged over his last two years.119  During President George H.W. Bush’s 
administration (1989-1993), major-rule costs continued to climb to $8.5 
billion per year while comparable figures for President Clinton’s first term 
(1993-1996) and second term (1997-2000) were $5.7 billion per year and 
$8.5 billion per year, respectively.120  For the first forty-four months of 
President George W. Bush’s tenure, the major-rule costs averaged $1.7 
billion per year, or about sixty-eight percent lower than the annual average 
for the previous twenty years.121
E. Projected Benefits and Costs of Major Rulemakings, 1981-2004 
 
OIRA is still collecting the fragments of agency information on the 
projected benefits of major rules for 1981 to 1991, a period when benefit 
estimation was in its infancy, especially for rules related to public health, 
safety, and environmental policy.  OIRA has assembled what is known 
about agency benefit projections for major rules issued from 1992 to 2004, 
 
 117. See W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 4 (2005) 
(estimating that the cost of federal regulations totals $1.1 trillion). 
 118. See OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 37, fig.2-1. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Most of the costs incurred during President Clinton’s second term were due to a 
flood of rules issued in the last year of his Administration, many just prior to the Florida 
recount in late 2000. 
 121. The major factor in the cost figure for 2001 was the repeal of OSHA’s ergonomics 
rule on November 14, 2000.  After the final rule was issued, Congress passed Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 6 to overturn the rule under the Congressional Review Act, and it was 
signed into law by President George W. Bush in March of 2001.  The enactment of Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 6 was estimated to result in a $4.8 billion cost savings in 2001.  Pub. L. 
No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001). 
GRAHAM_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:23 PM 
126 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  [Vol. XXXIII 
a subsample of 111 rules where agencies projected both benefits and 
costs.122
The good news is that, during this period, the average annual benefits of 
major rules, estimated at $19.1 billion, exceeded the average annual costs 
of major rules, estimated at $5.6 billion.  These figures account for both the 
number of major rules and the benefits and costs of those rules.  
The overall rate of net benefits from major rules was significantly larger 
under President George W. Bush than in the 1990s.
 
123
A different performance indicator is the average benefit and average cost 
of a major rule.  During the thirteen-year period from 1992 to 2004, the 
average annualized benefit of a major rule was $2.24 billion, a significantly 
larger amount than the average annualized cost of a major rule, which was 
$0.48 billion per year. For the first forty-four months of the George W. 
Bush Administration, the average benefit to cost ratio for major rules was 
about thirteen, significantly larger than the average benefit-to-cost ratio for 
major rules during the previous nine years, which was approximately 
five.
 
124
In assessing the meaning of these figures, it is important to keep several 
caveats in mind.  First, many of these rules have unquantified benefits and 
unquantified costs.  The figures only account for projected rulemaking 
consequences that the agency was able to express in monetary units.  
Second, the figures are computed relative to a “do nothing” or “baseline” 
policy alternative, which creates a fairly easy benefit-cost test for the major 
rule.  A more difficult test would be a comparison of the adopted rule to 
the “next best” regulatory alternative, which is typically not to “do 
nothing” or adopt a simple “baseline” assumption.  Agencies, however, 
may be reluctant to report analytic results for “next-best” alternatives out of 
a concern that such results may be used by opponents to argue against the 
agency’s preferred rulemaking action.  Third, even when benefits exceed 
costs, net benefits are not necessarily maximized, which is a goal of 
Executive Order 12,866. 
  
F. Are Projected Benefit and Cost Estimates Accurate? 
The figures presented above are based on ex ante projections of 
regulatory costs and benefits, which means that the projections were made 
 
 122. See OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 38. 
 123. Id. 
 124. The figures were calculated using figure 2-2 from OMB, 2005 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 38. 
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by agency analysts before the rule was issued and implemented.125
In 2005, OIRA assembled forty-seven case studies of EPA, the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), the National 
Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) and NRC 
rules where validation information had been published by academic 
specialists, agencies, or think tanks.
  It 
would be very useful to know whether ex ante projections are accurate.  
Unfortunately, the number of rules that have been analyzed retrospectively, 
using ex post data, is quite small.  In fact, the “validation” literature on 
regulatory benefit-cost analysis amounts to a series of case studies.   
126  OIRA found that sometimes the 
estimates were accurate (+/- 25%), sometimes they were too large, and 
sometimes they were too small.  More frequently, however, both regulatory 
costs and benefits were overestimated, although the errors tend to be 
more frequent on the benefit side than the cost side of the ledger.  It is not 
clear whether the extent of these errors are large enough to call into 
question the regulatory alternatives selected by agencies; nor is it clear how 
many of these errors should have been diagnosed and corrected ex ante.127
Although the forty-seven cases are the largest database ever assembled 
on the accuracy issue, it is not known whether the findings from these 
forty-seven cases are representative (i.e., the forty-seven cases are a 
convenience sample drawn from the available literature).  More systematic 
research is needed to determine whether the estimates of projected costs 
and benefits published by federal agencies are accurate. 
 
III. RESPONDING TO COMMENTARY ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
It is now well accepted that benefit-cost analysis is playing a growing 
role in federal regulatory policy,128 both in the United States and around 
the world.129  Professor Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago has 
summarized this trend as the rise of the “Cost-Benefit State.”130
The growing influence of benefit-cost analysis in federal regulatory 
 
 
 125. Id. at 41. 
 126. Id. at 41-43. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1415 
(2003) (stating that “cost-benefit analysis is a fait accompli”) (emphasis added). 
 129. See OMB, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 64-69 (providing 
information on regulatory governance documents in other developed countries). 
 130. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF 
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002).  But see Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 
ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 12 (1998) (“I am skeptical about Professor Sunstein’s cost-benefit 
state.”). 
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policy has stimulated concerns among scholars and activists.  Some 
commentators argue that benefit-cost analysis has a systematic pro-
business bias that will lead to insufficient federal regulation, particularly 
in fields of public health, safety, and environmental policy.131  There are at 
least two strands to this argument: one concerns alleged flaws or biases in 
the analytic tool;132 the other concerns the way in which OMB employs its 
various authorities to oversee the federal regulatory agencies.133
Other commentators argue that federal agencies can too easily “fudge 
the figures” (e.g., exaggerate benefits and low-ball costs), resulting 
in continued expansion of federal regulation and a corresponding intrusion 
  
 
 131. See WILLIAM BUZBEE ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, REGULATORY 
UNDERKILL: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S INSIDIOUS DISMANTLING OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS, 1 (2004) [hereinafter BUZBEE ET AL., REGULATORY 
UNDERKILL] (noting that “regulated corporations have made determined and concerted 
efforts to use their wealth and political power to diminish or even eliminate various health, 
environment, and safety protections”); DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, 
supra note 91, at 4  (stating that cost-benefit analysis “enjoys strong support from regulated 
industry and the think tanks it funds”); DAVID M. DRIESEN, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REGULATION, THE FEASIBILITY PRINCIPLE, WHITE PAPER NO. 407, at 2 (Dec. 2004) 
[hereinafter DRIESEN, FEASIBILITY] (noting that cost-benefit analysis permits companies to 
“kill and injure people if it would ‘cost too much to refrain’”); LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK 
ACKERMAN, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y INST., PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 4 (2002) [hereinafter HEINZERLING & 
ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS] (“[T]he case for cost-benefit analysis of environmental 
protection is, at best, wildly optimistic and, at worst, demonstrably wrong.”); THOMAS O. 
MCGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO SUBVERT 
RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 197-216 (2004); Parker, supra note at 128, at 1368 (stating that 
“ex ante predictions likely understate net benefits in many cases”); Frank Ackerman et al., 
Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to Past Decisions: Was Environmental Protection Ever a 
Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 192 (2005) (“A rigid insistence on making regulations 
pass cost-benefit tests would, in retrospect, have gotten the wrong answer time after time.”); 
Herz, supra note 8, at 229 (“Regulatory review has always flourished in the context of 
environmental regulation.”). 
 132. See DRIESEN, FEASIBILITY, supra note 131, at 14 (endorsing the feasibility principle 
as a “rational alternative” to cost-benefit analysis); EILEEN GAUNA ET AL., CTR. FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER NO. 505, at 18 (2005) 
(“Agencies should embrace a precautionary approach to dealing with risky activities.”); Lisa 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2063-64 (1984) 
(noting that “fixation on quantified benefits to human health either assumes, as a normative 
matter, that benefits that cannot be counted do not count, or assumes, as a factual matter, 
that benefits that cannot be counted are not very big”) 
 133. See CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A PROJECT OF THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, 
WHITE PAPER NO. 501, at 6 (Jan. 2005) (providing that agencies should not be subject to 
“overbearing supervision by the White House at the behest of regulated entities”); Morrison, 
supra note 9, at 1067 (stating that it is “one thing for OMB to play the role of institutional 
skeptic” and “another for it to second-guess technical decisions” made by career personnel, 
Cabinet officers or agency heads); Olson, supra note 9, at 14 (“OMB review politicizes 
technical issues, if only because of the office’s admitted anti-regulatory bias.”). 
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into personal freedom, privacy, and free enterprise.134  They argue that 
alternative regulatory checks and balances are needed.135
Some commentators, who see the growth of federal regulation as a 
problem per se,
  We address these 
concerns, with the benefit of almost five years of practical 
experience implementing a vigorous OIRA oversight program. 
 136 believe that analytical requirements (e.g., benefit-cost 
tests on new rules) enforced through OIRA review (and/or judicial review) 
are not an adequate solution.  They point to the fact that the federal 
regulatory establishment, measured by the number of agency employees, 
the number of new rules, and the estimated size of regulatory burdens, has 
grown steadily since 1981, despite the creation of a centralized office of 
regulatory oversight within the Executive Office of the President.137  They 
also argue that OIRA’s oversight staff is too small and powerless relative to 
the vast federal regulatory bureaucracy.138  They also emphasize that the 
independent federal regulatory agencies operate outside of OIRA 
oversight.139
 
 134. See LEWIS, supra note 36, at 16 (“Agencies have an obvious incentive to downplay 
the costs and exaggerate the benefits of the programs they administer.”); Crews, Promise 
and Peril, supra note 65, at 346 (“Agencies inevitably believe that all of their regulations 
confer net benefits.”); Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Regulatory Spending Escalation, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002, at A15 (noting that cost-benefit analysis of rules by agencies is a form 
of “self-policing”). 
  These commentators argue for a variety of more fundamental 
 135. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., REGULATORY REFORM PROJECT, JUMP, JIVE AN’ REFORM 
REGULATION: HOW WASHINGTON CAN TAKE A SWING AT REGULATORY REFORM 4-21 (2000) 
(suggesting various reforms of the regulatory system including Congressional approval of 
all agency rules before they are binding on the public) [hereinafter CREWS, JUMP JIVE]. 
 136. See ROBERT W. HAHN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDS., 
REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2000) (“During the past two 
decades, the developed countries have witnessed an unparalleled rise in new regulations 
related to the environment, health, and safety.”); GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS, 
supra note 20, at 2 (stating that “all rules come at a cost: a ‘regulatory tax’ imposed on all 
Americans”); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 12 (“The costs of federal regulation are large, 
growing, and, what is more disturbing, uncontrolled.”); Crews, Regulatory Spending 
Escalation, supra note 134 at A15 (“Estimated costs of meeting the demands of off-budget 
regulations hit $854 billion in 2001.”). 
 137. See GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that 
“regulation has been growing in size and scope for decades”); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 8 
(stating that “the cost of regulation may be much greater than official estimates suggest.”); 
MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF AMER. BUS., PROGRESS IN FEDERAL 
REGULATORY POLICY, 1980-2000, CONTEMPORARY ISSUE SERIES NO. 100, at 7 (2000) 
(stating that in the mid-1980s, “[a]ggregate regulatory costs resumed their upward climb”). 
 138. See GATTUSO, REGULATING THE REGULATORS, supra note 65, at 2 (“regulators have 
outmanned OIRA’s approximately 50 staffers by some 2,500 to one, making effective 
oversight difficult.”); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 17 (“Although agencies routinely claim high 
benefit-cost ratios for their rules, OMB does not—and due to resource restraints cannot—
validate such claims.”). 
 139. See GATTUSO, REINING IN THE REGULATORS, supra note 20, at 13 (stating that 
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institutional reforms to reduce the size of the federal regulatory state: 
greater congressional accountability for new regulations, 140 automatic 
sunset provisions for existing rules,141 and enactment of an annual 
regulatory budget for unfunded mandates on the private sector and state 
and local governments.142  Insofar as OIRA is to be responsible for 
stimulating the quality of agency-conducted regulatory analysis, some 
commentators contend that OIRA should focus on accurate accounting of 
regulatory costs and dispense with the speculative task of estimating 
regulatory benefits,143 since agencies can simply fudge the benefit figures 
to make a case for the rules that they desire.144
The current structure of OIRA oversight, because it is aimed only at 
“significant” new rules, is not designed to restrain the total number of rules 
issued by the federal government.  Each year, only approximately 600
  We assess briefly below the 
views of these commentators. 
145  
out of approximately 8,000146
 
independent agencies should be subjected to the OIRA review process or “at least be 
required to prepare cost-benefit analyses of all planned significant rules and to forward the 
analyses to OIRA for non-binding review”); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 53 (“Given the 
potentially devastating impacts of ill-designed economic rules . . .  a strong case can be 
made for extending OMB review to independent agency rulemakings.”). 
 new rulemakings are judged by OIRA and 
federal agencies to be significant enough to justify formal OIRA review. 
As long as OIRA is not reviewing most new rules, it is not reasonable to 
 140. See CREWS, JUMP JIVE, supra note 135, at 4 (stating that there is a “compelling” case 
for sending rules to Congress for approval); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 8 (“Congress should 
have to approve economically significant rules before they go into effect.”); Crews, 
Regulatory Spending Escalation, supra note 134 at A15 (“If Congress were to vote on 
agency rules (in an expedited fashion) before they are binding, it would fulfill citizens’ right 
to ‘No regulations without representation.’”); Crews, Promise and Peril, supra note 65, at 
364 (“[A]gency regulations should be turned into bills requiring passage by Houses of 
Congress and a Presidential signature.”). 
 141. CREWS, JUMP JIVE, supra note 135, at 20-21 (stating that Congress should consider 
sunsetting existing regulations). 
 142. See LEWIS, supra note 36, at 72 (“Under a regulatory budget, agencies would be 
required, in advance of proposing rules, to meet a particular statutory objective, to obtain 
authority from Congress to spend private sector resources via regulation.”); WEIDENBAUM, 
supra note 137, at 2 (“Each congressional committee ought to be required to present 
estimates of the likely benefits and costs of regulatory actions necessary to implement 
proposed legislation.”). 
 143. CREWS, JUMP JIVE, supra note 135, at 9-11 (stating that, in order to stop the 
controversy over agency consideration of benefits, agencies “should concentrate solely on 
assessing and fully presenting the costs of their initiatives—much as the federal budget 
focuses only on the amount of taxes, not the benefits of dollars spent”). 
 144. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 145. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY MATTERS: REGULATORY REVIEW: 
LISTS AND STATISTICS, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol.html#rr. 
 146. The number 8,000 is derived from a count of all documents (including both 
proposed and final rules) in the Rulemaking section of the FEDERAL REGISTER. 
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expect that OIRA review will result in fewer rules being issued by 
agencies. 
In the Reagan years, under Executive Order 12,291, agencies submitted 
all new rules to OIRA for review.  However, this system proved to 
be impractical since most rulemakings are of minor importance and did not 
justify centralized review by the Executive Office of the President.  As a 
practical matter, most minor rules were not subjected to rigorous review, 
even in the Reagan years.  When President Clinton designed Executive 
Order 12,866, with the explicit focus on OMB review of significant rules, 
he formalized a development that was already occurring on a more ad hoc 
basis during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush years.   
The “smart-regulation” philosophy implemented by Dr. Graham during 
his tenure as OIRA Administrator is based on the premise that each 
rulemaking proposal should be reviewed on its merits, accounting for the 
benefits and costs of the proposal compared to the regulatory and non-
regulatory policies already in place.  According to this philosophy, 
regulatory burdens are not necessarily inappropriate if they can be justified 
by a valid benefits analysis, including a consideration of regulatory 
alternatives that might accomplish the same degree of benefit at lower cost 
to society.  
Some commentators point out that “independent” regulatory agencies 
operate outside OMB oversight yet are responsible for a large volume of 
rulemaking that can be quite costly.147  Scholars continue to question 
the legitimacy of the independent regulatory agency.148
Some have suggested requiring that the Congress vote to approve each 
  As a practical 
matter, however, the rulemakings of independent agencies are subject only 
to Congressional (and judicial) supervision because that has been the 
preference of the Congress.  
 
 147. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 663 (1984) (“The power to balance 
competing goals—and the concomitant power to influence at least to some degree the 
agencies’ exercise of discretion—can only be the President’s. . . .  This outcome does not 
vary with whether the agencies are denominated independent.”); ABA COMM’N ON LAW 
AND THE ECON., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION, SUPPORT FOR 
LIMITED PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY OVER MAJOR REGULATORY DECISIONS 6 (1999):P 
While it may be that some agencies or issues should remain free of presidential 
review, it is urged that the exemptions be kept to a minimum.  No clear or 
principled decision underlines the current distinctions between ‘independent’ 
agencies, executive branch agencies, and ‘independent agencies within the 
executive branch.’  Agencies of all kinds consider basic economic and social 
policy decisions that elected officials can and should be capable of addressing. 
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federal rule before it goes into effect.149  The current disapproval 
mechanism in the Congressional Review Act, which enables congressional 
disapproval of rulemakings through expedited legislative procedures, 
places the burden on Congress to act against new rules.150
Some also make the argument that OIRA should abandon the effort to 
improve agency analysis of regulatory benefits and instead focus primarily 
or exclusively on improved measurement of regulatory costs.
  Some 
commentators would like to see a reversal of the presumption so that new 
rules do not take effect unless Congress takes affirmative action—by 
enacting a law—to approve them.  While these commentators can point to 
the rare use of the expedited CRA procedures, it is not clear whether a 
requirement for active legislative approval of each new rule would 
really impact the number of new rules that take effect. 
151  With 
more accurate cost figures, they argue, an annual cap on regulatory 
“expenditures” (i.e., unfunded mandates on the private sector and state and 
local governments) could be imposed on each regulatory agency, much like 
the annual appropriations limits that agencies face for “on-budget” 
expenditures.152
Although we believe that the idea of a formal “regulatory budget” has 
promise (but would need to be subject to pilot projects and evaluation), the 
effort to improve the quality of benefits analysis at federal agencies would 
still need to continue.  Presumably, programs with strong benefit 
justification should receive more generous treatment under a regulatory 
budget than programs without a strong benefit justification.  Without 
information on benefits, however uncertain, there is no analytic basis for 
determining how large a regulatory “budget” or appropriation should be.  
In short, the interest in “regulatory budget” reform should accentuate the 
need for valid benefit measurement as well as cost measurement.  
  Under this argument, the task of OIRA would then 
become an accounting exercise of making sure that new rules proposed by 
an agency do not have total annual costs that exceed the “budget” that has 
been allocated (by Congress and/or OIRA) to that agency.  
Some commentators are concerned that the emphasis on benefit-cost 
analysis in regulatory policy creates a pro-business bias in health, safety, 
 
 149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 150. Under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2006), before a rule 
can take effect, the agency must submit a brief report on the rule to each House of Congress.  
5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A). Congress can utilize expedited procedures to adopt a joint 
resolution of disapproval to disapprove the rule.  5 U.S.C. § 802. 
 151. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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and environmental rulemakings.153  This bias, they argue, arises because 
the costs associated with the federal regulation of business tend to be 
overestimated, while many of the benefits of public health, safety, and 
environmental regulation are difficult to quantify or are simply intangible 
in nature.154  They allege further that OIRA oversight of the rulemaking 
process is tilted too much toward finding cases of overregulation and not 
enough to finding cases of underregulation.155  Finally, echoing technical 
concerns made decades ago, these commentators argue that there are 
technical flaws in benefit-cost analysis (e.g., the ways that lifesaving is 
valued in monetary units and the ways that future benefits are discounted to 
present value) that work against needed protective regulations.156  Instead 
of emphasizing better benefit-cost analysis, these commentators argue for 
greater emphasis on “the precautionary principle” and “feasibility” in 
regulatory decision making.157
The technical concerns voiced in recent law review articles and book 
publications are not new.  They do not differ significantly from similar 
 
 
 153. See DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 92, at 17 (With 
cost-benefit analysis, OMB “has effectively created an additional hurdle that government 
officials must jump through to create enforceable standards protecting health, safety, and the 
environment.  It has created a formidable presumption against the many rules that product 
non-quantifiable benefits.”); HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra 
note 131, at 27 (“[I]n practice, cost-benefit analysis tends to skew decision-making against 
protecting public health and the environment.”); MCGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED 
SABOTAGE, supra note 131, at 197-216. 
 154. See DRIESEN, FEASIBILITY, supra note 131, at 9-10 (“For many important health and 
environmental effects, quantification [of benefits] is simply impossible” and so cost-benefit 
analysis can result in agency paralysis.); BUZBEE ET AL., supra note 131, at 4 (stating that 
industry “has a strong incentive to overstate the costs of regulation” and is “far more 
difficult to generate the benefits side of the regulatory equation.”). 
 155. DRIESEN, IS COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 91, at 2 (“OMB has 
used [cost-benefit analysis] as a one-way ratchet that moves in a single direction if it moves 
at all, frequently weakening agency proposals, but never strengthening them.”). 
 156. See id. at 4 (“Data gaps usually make quantitative risk assessment impossible or 
very difficult.”); HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra note 131, at 22 
(stating that “discounting ignores the possibility of catastrophic and irreversible harm”); 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 132, at 2055-56 
(questioning “whether the future benefits of health and environmental regulation should be 
discounted at all, and, if so, at what rate”); Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The 
Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 657 (2002) 
(“Discounting . . . systematically downgrades the importance of actions taken to prevent 
long-latency diseases and long-term ecological harm.”); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
941, 948 (1999) (stating that the regulatory process should have “a more thoughtful 
valuation of human lives threatened by environmental carcinogens” and should not use 
“OMB’s deeply flawed technique of taking valuations from the workplace setting and 
reducing them by an inflated discount rate”). 
 157. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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concerns that were raised in the 1970s and 1980s and addressed by 
proponents of benefit-cost analysis of regulation.158
i. Validity of benefit and cost figures.  
  Rather than review 
this thirty-year literature and debate, we focus here on some technical and 
institutional developments that are relevant to these concerns. 
While some commentators point to specific cases where the costs of 
rules were overstated and/or the benefits of rules understated,159 there is 
very little systematic study of the validity of pre-regulation estimates, based 
on real-world information from the post-regulation period.  The limited 
literature that does exist was recently reviewed by OMB in its final 2005 
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation.160  
This literature reveals that all types of errors in estimation occur, with no 
clear indication of policy bias against regulation.161
ii. Cost measurement 
  If anything, the 
anecdotal studies now available suggest that the benefit-cost ratios of new 
rules were more likely to have been overstated than understated by agency 
analysts, when real-world data are examined after a rule has been applied.  
Some commentators allege that the costs of federal regulation are 
overstated by agency analysts who are compelled to rely uncritically on 
biased information submitted by regulated entities.162
 
 158. Nicholas A. Ashford, Alternatives to Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Decisions, 
363 ANN. N.Y. ACAD.  SCI. 129 (1981) (criticizing cost-benefit analysis as a flawed 
decision-making tool). 
  Moreover, they 
argue, the pre-regulation estimates of costs prepared by agency analysts do 
 159. Thomas McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2042 (2002) [hereinafter, McGarity & 
Ruttenberg, Counting the Costs] (“Numerous other studies support the general conclusion 
that ex ante cost estimates tend to be much higher than real-world compliance costs.”).  But 
see ROBERT W. HAHN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDS., IN DEFENSE 
OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION 59 (2005) [hereinafter HAHN, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF REGULATION] (“The solution to legitimate concerns [about quantitative cost-
benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis] raised by the critics is not to eliminate the 
quantitative analysis, but to gain a deeper understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, 
and to use it wisely.”). 
 160. OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 41-52. 
 161. Id. 
 162. HEIZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra note 131, at 28 (stating 
that cost estimates are “usually provided by the regulated industries themselves, which have 
an obvious incentive to offer high estimates of costs as a way of warding off new regulatory 
requirements”); McGarity & Ruttenberg, Counting the Costs, supra note 159, at 1998 (“In 
preparing regulatory impact assessments for proposed rules, agencies are heavily dependent 
upon the regulated entities for information about compliance costs.”). 
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not account for the learning, innovation, and economies of scale that are 
accomplished by businesses after a regulation is adopted and implemented.  
Unlike other commentators, who fear that agency cost (and benefit) 
estimates are manipulated to make rules look artificially good,163 these 
commentators fear that the analyses tend to inflate costs and thereby 
portray good rules in an unfavorable light.164
If agencies use state-of-the-art tools when estimating regulatory costs, 
they can minimize the potential for bias in cost estimation.  One technique 
is to request confidential cost information from individual companies in a 
regulated industry, both aggregate compliance cost information for a rule 
and itemized cost estimates for particular technologies and compliance 
practices.  By comparing the confidential information supplied by different 
regulated companies, agencies can identify estimates that appear to be 
outliers on the high side or low side.  Another technique is to request 
confidential cost information from suppliers to regulated firms as well as 
from the regulated entities themselves.  The incentives of suppliers may be 
different from regulated firms, since the supplier (e.g., a producer or 
distributor of pollution-control equipment) may benefit from a regulatory 
alternative that is burdensome to the regulated entity.  Comparing cost 
estimates provided by suppliers and regulated firms is another useful way 
to identify outlier estimates.  
   
In cases where a technology is already sold in the marketplace, the 
observed market price of the technology may be a useful surrogate for the 
marginal cost of production.  Where the market price is likely to be an 
inaccurate estimate of producer cost (e.g., due to monopoly or externalities 
in the production process), the analyst can commission a “tear-down” study 
that constructs the cost of the technology from its original inputs, 
including the costs of both materials and labor.  Analysts often find that 
the marginal costs of producing a new technology decline as producers 
learn about potential cost-saving measures and employ cost-saving 
innovations in the production process.  Marginal costs may also decline as 
a producer achieves the economies of scale associated with mass 
production.  Some agency analysts are already employing pre-regulation 
adjustment factors that reduce estimated regulatory costs based on 
projections of learning, innovation and economies of scale.  
Given the various tools of cost estimation available to the agency 
analyst, it is feasible to estimate accurately the compliance costs associated 
with new technologies, usually with a margin of error that does not exceed 
 
 163. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 164. Id.. 
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a factor of two. 
iii. The discount rate 
For many health, safety, and environmental regulations, the costs of a 
rule are projected to occur before, sometimes years (or even decades) 
before, its benefits.  The largest cost items associated with expensive 
federal rules are typically one-time capital costs associated with new 
technology, costs that can be considered investments in health, safety, and 
environmental improvement that may occur over the life of the new 
technology (or even further into the future).  A longstanding technical issue 
in benefit-cost analysis concerns how benefits and costs that occur at 
different points in time should be compared.  Some commentators are 
concerned that the discounting procedure used by economists is biased 
against health, safety, and environmental protection.165
The accepted technical solutions are to either (1) convert the stream of 
future benefits into present value, using an appropriate discount rate, 
thereby allowing proper comparison of benefits to capital and operating 
costs, or (2) annualize the capital costs over the life of the 
investment, using an appropriate interest rate, to facilitate comparison of 
costs to benefits (which presumably can be expressed as a smooth annual 
benefit stream).  The difference between a present value and a 
smooth stream of payments is familiar to the mortgage purchaser, who 
faces a total mortgage and an annualized (or monthly) payment over the 
life of the mortgage, computed using an interest rate. It can be shown that 
the two procedures lead to identical rankings of policy alternatives based 
on net benefits (benefits minus costs).  Consequently, the choice of 
computational procedure is really a matter of convenience and clarity of 
presentation.  Note that the second procedure entails annualization—and 
enlargement—of costs, without any discounting of future benefits, while 
the first procedure adjusts future benefits downward as aggregation occurs, 
without adjusting costs.  
  
The rationale for discounting needs to be considered because some 
commentators allege that the discounting procedure biases regulatory 
analysis against health, safety, and environmental protection.  In particular, 
they are disturbed about the powerful mathematical impact of the discount 
rate on future benefits from many health, safety, and environmental 
regulations.166
 
 165. See supra note 
 
156 and accompanying text. 
 166. HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra note 131, at 21 (stating 
that “discounting looks like a fancy justification for foisting our problems off onto the 
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There are two economic arguments for giving more weight to an 
immediate cost (or benefit) than a future benefit or cost (of the same 
inflation-adjusted dollar value).167  One is based on investment theory, 
while the other reflects consumption theory.  Investment theory states that 
any immediate cost represents a foregone investment opportunity.168  If the 
immediate cost is deferred, the resulting savings can be invested at a 
positive rate of return that is defined by the expected inflation-adjusted 
(“real”) rate of interest in the economy.  (The inflation-adjusted rate of 
interest is also the real discount rate used by analysts when transforming a 
future cost or benefit into present value).  Consumption theory posits that 
consumers generally prefer gratification from a good sooner rather than 
later.169
Some commentators insist that the arguments for discounting may apply 
to money but do not necessarily apply to health protection.
  Even public opinion surveys framed in a societal context suggest 
that people would prefer that lives be saved sooner rather than later.  
Implicitly, investment theory also relies on consumption theory, since the 
ultimate value of returns on investment is greater consumption (and 
consumer satisfaction) in the future.  
170  There are 
two responses.  First, the investment rationale for discounting can be used 
to annualize the one-time costs of rules, without making any assumption 
that saving lives in the future is less valuable than saving lives today.171  
Thus, the first accepted technical solution (described above) does not 
depend on a policy judgment that the intrinsic value of saving lives 
declines over time.  Second, insofar as money and health are fungible in 
everyday life and both contribute to the welfare of consumers, then 
whatever time preference is observed in monetary transactions involving 
consumption is also, at the margin, applicable to consumer valuation of 
health gains.172
There is considerable debate about what numeric rate of discount should 
  
 
people who came after us.”). 
167 J. Lipscomb et al., Time Preference, in COST EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 
214-46 (Marthe R. Gold et al., eds. 1996). 
168 See id. at 216-19. 
169 Id.  
 170. See supra notes 151 and 160 and accompanying text. 
 171. W. KIP VISCUSI, DISCOUNTING HEALTH EFFECTS FOR MEDICAL DECISIONS IN 
VALUING HEALTH CARE 133 (Frank A. Sloan ed., 1996) (providing a numeric example 
demonstrating how discounting future lives saved is equivalent to accounting for the 
opportunity cost of capital). 
 172. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 
34-50 (1992) (presenting evidence of the value of life from labor market case studies). 
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be used in regulatory analysis,173
The most recent OMB guidance on selecting a discount rate for use in 
regulatory analysis has three prongs.
 but there is a strong technical consensus 
that the same numeric rate of discount should be applied to both benefits 
and costs.  The following paradox results from applying a smaller annual 
rate of discount to benefits than to costs: delaying an investment that saves 
lives in the future will always be desirable if the analyst is permitted to 
assign a smaller discount rate to future benefits than to costs.   
174  First, it instructs agency analysts to 
present analytic results based on real discount rates of three and seven 
percent, the former justified when the costs of the rule are likely to be 
incurred in the form of higher prices for consumer products (i.e., 
consumption losses) and the latter justified when the costs of the rule are 
likely to be incurred in the form of displaced private investment (e.g., loss 
of returns on investment).175  Second, three and seven percent can be 
supplemented by another rate when a strong technical case is made in the 
context of a specific rulemaking.176  Finally, when intergenerational 
impacts of a rule are important, the guidance authorizes presentation of 
results with a rate lower than three percent, since there is significant 
technical debate about what the intergenerational discount rate should 
be.177  The new OMB policy is considerably different than the policy in 
place during the Clinton Administration, which gave primary emphasis to 
analytic results using a seven percent real rate of discount,178
iv. Unquantified benefits 
 although EPA 
guidelines have given credence to three percent since the 1990s. 
Some commentators are concerned that benefit-cost analyses are biased 
against health, safety, and environmental regulations because the 
benefits seem to be less quantifiable than the costs.179
 
 173. See HAHN, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION, supra note 
  Conceptually, there 
159, at 7; DISCOUNTING 
AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 6 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999)  
(presenting a volume of papers that all assume that benefits and costs should be discounted 
at some positive rate but vary in opinion about the appropriate rate). 
174 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 80. 
175 Id.  
176 Id. 
177 Id.  
 178. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (1996), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html. 
 179. See DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 91, at 4 (“Some 
health effects and most environmental effects cannot be quantified at all, because of large 
data gaps.”). 
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are two challenges in benefit measurement: quantifying the physical 
impacts of rules on human health and environmental quality, and 
quantifying the monetary value of the reductions in these impacts.  For 
example, mortality impacts from cancer or heart disease may be more 
readily quantified than subtle forms of morbidity (e.g., neurological 
effects) and related impacts on quality of life.  Even if human health 
impacts can be fully quantified, it may not be feasible to fully quantify the 
physical impacts of a rule on natural resources, endangered species, 
ecosystems and environmental quality.  Once physical impacts are 
quantified, a complete monetary expression of benefits may not be feasible 
due to the lack of validated tools and data to express the public’s economic 
demand for these benefits. 
Unquantified benefits are a serious concern in regulatory analysis.  In 
Circular A-4, OMB’s most recent analytic guidance to agencies, agency 
analysts are instructed to identify and consider non-quantified benefits and 
costs: 
It will not always be possible to express in monetary units all of the 
important benefits and costs.  When it is not, the most efficient alternative 
will not necessarily be the one with the largest quantified and monetized 
net benefit estimate.  In such cases, you should exercise professional 
judgment in determining how important the non-quantified benefits and 
costs may be in the context of the overall analysis. 180
OMB also instructs agency analysts to include a summary table that lists 
all of the unquantified benefits and costs.
   
181  They are also urged to use 
their professional judgment in highlighting the most important non-
quantified or non-monetized impacts.182
Analysts in the European Commission are now taking even more 
seriously the need to weight non-quantifiable benefits and costs by some 
indication of their likely importance.
 
183  A categorical weighting scheme is 
used to place anywhere from one dot to four dots on each unquantified 
benefit and cost, representing the analyst’s view as to the likely importance 
in the overall analysis.184
 
 180. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 
  It may be worthwhile for regulatory analysts in 
the United States to consider a similar approach. 
80, at 2. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. In October of 2005, the European Commission released a benefit-cost analysis of its 
thematic clean air strategy.  See AEA Technology, Cost Benefit Analysis of the Thematic 
Strategy on Air Pollution (Oct. 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/cafe/general/pdf/cba_thematic_strategy_0510.pdf.  
 184. See id. 
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v. Distributional concerns 
Some commentators are concerned that a pure benefit-cost analysis 
may ignore crucial “distributional” matters that should be of concern to 
policy makers.185  OMB guidance, however, on regulatory-impact analysis 
already encourages agencies to provide a meticulous accounting of a wide 
range of distributional impacts including impacts on the environment, 
impacts on children, impacts on small businesses, impacts on state and 
local governments, impacts on the energy sector, and any transfers of 
income or wealth that are expect to occur between segments of society.186
vi. The policy impacts of interagency review 
  
Since the number of distributional impacts to be considered is potentially 
infinite, relevant statutes and executive orders typically govern which 
distributional impacts are analyzed.  
Some commentators express concerns about the interagency reviews of 
rulemakings sponsored by OMB, 187
 
 185. Ashford, supra note 
 in addition to the alleged biases in the 
158, at 130 (“Environmental regulation is not really an 
instrument of economic policy; it is an instrument of social policy concerned with the nature 
and distribution of the effects of industrial activity.  Therefore, environmental regulation 
cannot be judged by economic criteria alone.”). 
 186. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, at 42-46. 
 187. Some are concerned that OMB review weakens rules.  See DRIESEN, IS COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 91, at 3 (“Opportunities [for OMB] to weaken a 
rule before its submission may make it unnecessary to weaken it during the formal review 
process.”).  It is just as plausible, however, to argue that OMB review strengthens rules.  
Some allege that OMB interferes with agency discretion by offering the agency a statutory 
interpretation different from the one the agency initially proposed when it submitted a draft 
rule for OMB review.  See Lisa Heinzerling, Remarks at The Fordham Urban Law Journal 
Symposium on the Contemporary Regulatory State (Feb. 23, 2006).  It is also well 
established, however,  that the President is authorized to “‘supervise and guide’ Executive 
Officers in ‘their construction of the statute under which they act in order to secure that 
unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently 
contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.’”  Dep’t of 
Justice/Office of Legal Counsel Opinion (Feb. 13, 1981) (quoting Myers v. United States, 
272 U.S. 52, 135 (1936)). Some critics have urged courts to play a role in rules that have 
been changed due to OMB input.  See Olson, supra note 9, at 74-77 (stating that courts 
should protect the agency’s statutory delegation of authority from OMB supervision and 
require that OMB comments to the agency be docketed to preserve the agency’s 
decisionmaking integrity”).  Such litigation, however, is not likely to succeed.  First, court 
decisions have recognized the legality of executive regulatory review.  Ruckelshaus v. 
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, No. 85-1747, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13791, at *13 (D.C. Cir. 
Nov. 18, 1985) (providing that the dialogue between OMB and an agency during OMB’s 
regulatory review “is entitled to deference even greater than that accorded intra-agency 
deliberations”); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The Court 
recognizes the basic need of the President and his White House staff to monitor the 
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analytics of benefit-cost analysis.  If interagency review were neutral, they 
argue, it would be just as likely to result in more stringent rules as less 
stringent rules.188  In reality, they argue, interagency review is not neutral 
because it is much more likely to reduce (rather than increase) 
the stringency of public health, safety, and environmental rules.189  The 
implication is that the interagency review process focuses only on ways to 
reduce the costs of rules, without considering ways to increase benefits.  
These commentators base their critique on a sample of rulemakings studied 
by GAO190 where the impact of interagency review was documented, as 
well as on some anecdotal case studies of specific rules where information 
on the impact of interagency review can be gleaned from the publicly 
available information or deliberative information that has been 
disclosed.191
Moreover, Professor John Mendeloff of the University of Pittsburgh, in 
studies of risk regulation, has found that overregulation (defined as overly 
stringent rules) tends to cause underregulation (insufficient breadth and 
  The assumption that underpins this critique, that agency 
submissions of draft rules are just as likely to be insufficiently stringent as 
overly stringent, has not been validated.  In any event, a neutral interagency 
review process—one faithful to both cost and benefit concerns—should 
address these critiques. 
 
consistency of executive agency regulations with Administration policy.”); see also 
Percival, supra note 8, at 197 (Questions about the legality (including constitutionality) of 
OMB’s oversight in rulemaking have sparked considerable scholarly debate, although the 
Sierra Club opinion is the clearest indication of the “legality and propriety of [White House] 
regulatory review.”).  Second, “courts are eager to avoid what the District of Columbia 
Circuit has characterized as ‘difficult constitutional questions concerning the executive’s 
proper role in administrative proceedings and the appropriate scope of delegated power from 
Congress to certain executive agencies.’”  Percival, supra note 8, at 167. 
 188. See DRIESEN, IS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS NEUTRAL?, supra note 91, at 2 (stating that 
OMB’s use of cost-benefit analysis under President George W. Bush “has been a tool often 
used to weaken standards, and never used by OMB to make agency proposals stricter or 
more extensive than what the agency was inclined to do on its own”). 
 189. Id. at 17; Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the 
Bush Administration, Part II, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10485, 10488 (2004) [hereinafter 
Heinzerling & Steinzor, A Perfect Storm, Part II] (“[C]ost-benefit analysis in the Bush 
Administration has been a one-way street—used to justify delaying or weakening 
regulation, not to strengthen it.  When cost-benefit analysis almost certainly would justify 
strengthening regulation, especially environmental regulation, OIRA has kept it holstered in 
its belt.”). 
 190. GAO, 2003 REGULATORY REVIEW REPORT, supra note 73, at 69-102. 
 191. See HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS, supra note 131, at 17-20 
(examining cost-benefit analysis as applied to EPA’s 2001 arsenic rule); see generally 
Heinzerling & Steinzor, A Perfect Storm, Part I, supra note 87 (examining and criticizing 
EPA’s mercury rule); Heinzerling & Steinzor, A Perfect Storm, Part II, supra note 189 
(same). 
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volume of rulemaking). 192
In the final analysis, what matters are the benefits and costs of the final 
rules that are issued, not the various procedures and counter-pressures that 
influence the final product.  Since the evidence suggests that the “smart 
regulation” approach to rulemaking—one with a combination of agency 
and OIRA initiation, as well as interagency review—is inducing an 
increase in net benefits compared to the Clinton Administration, there is no 
particular reason to suggest that OIRA (and other interagency) review 
activities should be curtailed or lessened. 
  He argues that as the stringency of rules 
increases, the resulting costs trigger more resistance—technical, political, 
and legal—from the regulated community, forcing the regulatory agency to 
invest more staffing, time, and legal resources in the completion of each 
rulemaking.  Mendeloff posits that a more moderate approach to stringency 
based on benefit-cost considerations may permit a regulatory agency to 
undertake more rulemakings than an approach that maximizes risk 
reduction in each rulemaking, without regard to costs. 
OIRA’s role in facilitating strong federal regulations to protect public 
health, safety, and the environment is already well documented in the 
public record: 
• In the first use of the “prompt” letter, OIRA encouraged the 
Food and Drug Administration to finalize a rule initiated in the 
Clinton Administration that requires the food industry to label 
foods for trans-fat content.193
• In an unusual collaboration that began early in the rulemaking 
process, OIRA worked with EPA on a new rule aimed at 
reducing the amount of diesel exhaust from off-road engines 
used in construction, mining and agriculture by ninety 
percent.
  Like saturated fat, a growing 
body of scientific evidence links the trans-fat content of foods to 
the development of coronary heart disease. FDA projects that 
the new food-label requirement will stimulate almost $100 in 
public health benefit for each one dollar in cost to industry and 
consumers. 
194
 
 192. JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES REGULATION: HOW 
OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA (1988). 
  By 2030, this rule’s net benefits are expected to be 
$76 billion annually, with $78 billion in benefits and $2 billion 
in costs (in 2000 dollars).  
 193. Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrition Content Claims, 
and Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434 (July 11, 2003). 
 194. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 
Fed. Reg. 38,958 (June 29, 2004). 
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• OIRA also worked with EPA from the outset on a new rule 
aimed at reducing the sulfur and nitrogen emissions from coal-
fired power-plants by seventy-percent.195
• OIRA chaired the interagency task force that assisted DOT in 
two rulemakings related to the fuel economy of light trucks: the 
first rulemaking raised fuel-economy standards for model years 
2005 to 2007,
  When fully 
implemented in 2015, this rule’s net benefits are expected to be 
$83.2 billion annually, with $86.3 billion in benefits and $3.1 
billion in costs (in 1999 dollars).  This rulemaking is among the 
most important environmental policy initiatives in the Bush 
Administration.  
196 the first increases in almost a decade; the 
second rulemaking reformed the structure of the program to 
enhance safety while further increasing fuel-economy standards 
for model years 2008 to 2011.197
These examples illustrate that OIRA is not reluctant to have a pro-
regulatory impact when it is justified by sound science, engineering, and 
economics.  
  The more than eleven billion 
gallons of fuel savings from these two rulemakings are projected 
to be larger than any previous actions in the twenty-year history 
of DOT’s fuel-economy program for light trucks. 
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES IN REGULATORY POLICY 
While there is much encouraging news to report, serious challenges 
remain.  
A. Homeland Security 
The issue of homeland security will likely remain a central concern for 
many years to come.  While each passing day takes us farther away from 
the September 11 (“9/11”) terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, these horrible acts 
remain in the forefront of our memories as attacks continue elsewhere, and 
our government discovers evidence and thwarts potential threats. 
The 9/11 attacks revealed a regulatory issue that we must work to solve.  
While homeland security regulations accounted for approximately half of 
 
 195. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air 
Interstate Rule), 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005). 
 196. Light Truck Average Fuel Economy Standards Model Years 2005-2007, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 16,868 (Apr. 7, 2003). 
 197. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71 
Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006). 
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the federal government’s major-rule costs in 2004, there is not yet a 
feasible way to quantify benefits fully.  How do we identify a potential 
target and determine the probability of an attack,198
In its rule adopting security procedures for and allowing transient 
operations at three Maryland airports near Washington, D.C., the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) examined the costs and benefits of the 
regulation.
 the benefit achieved by 
avoiding the damages associated with an attack, and the effectiveness of 
the various countermeasures in reducing risk?   
199
[T]he primary benefit of the rule will be enhanced protection for a 
significant number of vital government assets in the National Capital 
Region, while keeping airports operational. . . .  The security provisions 
contained in this rule are an integral part of the effort to identify and 
defeat the threat posed by members of foreign terrorist groups to vital 
U.S. assets and security.  The TSA believes that the rule will reduce the 
risk that an airborne strike initiated from an airport moments away from 
vital national assets will occur.  The TSA recognizes that such an impact 
may not cause substantial damage to property or a large structure; 
however, it could potentially result in an undetermined number of 
fatalities and injuries and reduced tourism.  The resulting tragedy would 
adversely impact the regional economies.
  While providing detailed compliance costs, TSA’s benefits 
data was more limited; nonetheless, TSA concluded that the benefits of the 
rule would “vastly” exceed the costs: 
200
Similarly, in its proposed rule for flight restrictions in the Washington, 
D.C. Area, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acknowledged that 
the cost of an act of terrorism “is extremely difficult to quantify” and can 
include direct and indirect costs that are very high.
 
201
 
 198. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has embraced a risk-based 
approach for addressing threats to this nation.  See Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Dep’t 
of Homeland Security, Address at the George Washington University Homeland Security 
Policy Institute (Mar. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4391; Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the 
Dep’t of Homeland Security, Address, Second Stage Review Remarks (July 13, 2005), 
available at 
  Developing a 
methodology for estimating the benefits of avoiding a terrorist attack will 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597; Department of Homeland 
Security, Fact Sheet: Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure—Chemical Security (June 
15, 2005), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4543. 
 199. Maryland Three Airports: Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain 
Airports in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone, 70 Fed. Reg. 
7150 (Feb. 10, 2005). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed. Reg. 
45,250 (Aug. 4, 2005). 
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be a difficult but necessary task. 
As we implement regulations designed to increase security to protect 
lives and essential structures, we will also need to balance national security 
and privacy needs with the public’s right to know about the burdens 
imposed on them by these rules.  As OMB explained in its 2003 Report to 
Congress: 
Admittedly, it may be difficult for a regulatory agency to evaluate in 
specific instances the extent of the costs that a regulatory alternative 
would likely impose. In emergency situations, for example, an agency 
may not have much time to consider the various alternatives, much less 
the time to perform a full evaluation of their respective benefits and costs, 
before the agency must decide on a course of action. In such cases, 
agencies should conduct as much analysis as the situation permits. In 
addition, as commenters pointed out, it may be difficult for an agency to 
express the cost in quantifiable, as opposed to qualitative, terms. 
However, to the extent that an agency can quantify the regulatory impact, 
the agency should attempt to do so (e.g., by indicating the number of 
persons that would likely be affected by the regulation). This additional 
analysis is helpful in providing as complete a picture as possible of the 
implications and justification for the proposed regulatory approach. 202
In the same report, OMB also emphasized that the same tools of benefit-
cost analysis that are used in other regulatory contexts can—and should—
be applied as well in the evaluation of homeland security rules: 
 
Developing Federal regulations involves a series of steps: identifying the 
nature and extent of the problem; determining whether Federal action is 
needed or desirable; if it is determined that Federal action is needed or 
desirable, identifying the relevant legal authorities and the policy options; 
then evaluating those options based on their “pros” and “cons,” which 
includes an identification and consideration of the anticipated benefits and 
costs associated with each option; and, finally, concluding with a decision 
on which course of action to pursue. 
Homeland security regulations raise new issues and pose new challenges 
for Federal agencies. However, the same general framework should apply 
to the development of homeland security regulations as agencies have 
applied over the years in their development of other types of regulations. 
Federal agencies that address homeland security matters need to go 
through the same general steps in deciding whether Federal action is 
needed and desirable and, if so, in determining what course of action to 
 
 202. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 85 (2003) [hereinafter OMB, 2003 
REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
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pursue. In this regard, these agencies can and should, to the extent 
possible, use the standard tools of regulatory analysis that have been 
developed over the years to inform decision makers about the anticipated 
benefits and costs of the various policy options that they are 
considering.203
B. The Sea of Existing Regulations 
 
Another challenge faced not only by the newly-created DHS, which 
inherited many longstanding agencies with robust regulatory programs,204
Notwithstanding its limited resources, OIRA has undertaken modest 
efforts to address the old regulations and to determine if they are necessary.  
In 2001, OMB solicited public nominations of existing rules that should be 
modified or rescinded.
 
but also by most other federal departments, is the sea of existing 
regulations. 
205  OMB received seventy-one nominations and 
designated twenty-three as “high priority.”206  The agencies with the largest 
number of nominations were the Department of Labor and EPA.207  By 
December 2004, federal agencies had addressed most of the twenty-three 
priority nominations, as well as some of the lower-priority nominations.  
Most of the reforms were implemented by agencies without any need for 
legislative action.208
In 2002, OMB again solicited reform nominations after a significant 
outreach effort with the regulated communities.
 
209  The scope of eligible 
reforms was expanded to include guidance documents as well as rules.210  
OMB received 316 distinct nominations, a much larger number than it 
could evaluate in a priority-setting process.211  After referral to the agencies 
for evaluation, over one hundred of them were identified by the agencies as 
worthy of further evaluation and action.  Many of these one hundred are in 
the process of being reformed by agencies.212
 
 203. Id. at 85-86. 
 
 204. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is comprised of various agencies 
formerly associated with other departments including the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); TSA; and the U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG). 
 205. OMB, 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 77, at 61-134. 
 206. Id. at 61-62. 
 207. Id. at 62. 
 208. OMB, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 102, at 150-204. 
 209. OMB, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 75-85. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. OMB, 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 202, at 21-30. 
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In 2004, OMB chose to target the manufacturing sector of the U.S. 
economy for reform because economic studies indicate that this sector 
bears a disproportionate share of regulatory burden.213  Of the 189 reform 
nominations received, OMB worked with federal agencies to identify 
seventy-six that justified priority review and response.214  In its final 2005 
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation, OMB 
documented agency progress in meeting deadlines for activity on these 
seventy-six priority reforms.215
Although the number of reforms being pursued by OMB and the 
agencies in the 2001-2005 period is small compared to the total number of 
rules on the books, this amount of simplification work is stretching the 
resources available to both federal agencies and OMB.  While some of the 
reforms have been controversial in Congress (e.g., the streamlining of New 
Source Review procedures under the Clean Air Act and modernization of 
overtime regulations in the workplace), none of the reforms have been 
overturned by legislation or appropriations measures in the Congress. 
 
C. Collaboration with European Union Regulators 
Since U.S. and European rules tend to have a huge influence around the 
world, it is especially important that the United States and the European 
Union (E.U.) collaborate on regulatory matters.  Their track record in this 
regard, however, is mixed. 
The inability of these two major economic powers to proceed 
collaboratively can lead to outcomes that are very difficult to explain.  For 
example, the two sides of the Atlantic cannot agree on the proper design of 
the crash dummies that are used in automobile crash tests.  That means that 
vehicle manufacturers doing business both in the U.S. and in Europe face 
the prospect of undertaking separate crash tests using American and 
European dummies.  Actually, the difference between the two crash tests is 
not limited to the design of the crash test dummies.  In addition, the 
European dummy wears safety belts but the American dummy does not. 
All the news, however, is not bleak.  The quality of dialogue between the 
European Union and the Bush Administration is improving on a wide range 
of issues.  In September of 2005, OMB hosted a three-day visit by twelve 
 
 213. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY REFORM OF THE U.S. 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 1-66 (2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/reports/manufacturing_initiative.pdf. 
 214. Id. 
 215. OMB, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 117-25. 
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senior career officials from the European Commission (E.C.).216  The 
meeting participants compared notes on how the regulatory systems are 
evolving and how regulatory analysis is done in each system.  In January of 
2006, the E.C. hosted a meeting with OMB and agency personnel in 
Brussels, Belgium where information on the technical and institutional 
aspects of regulatory analysis in the U.S. and the E.U. was shared.217  The 
E.C. has become quite serious about regulatory reform.  The U.S. and E.C. 
agree that better regulation is a key to more jobs and prosperity.218
V. CONCLUSION 
  Both 
sides are determined to make more tangible progress on the challenge of 
regulatory collaboration, which will result in gains for both the American 
and European economies. 
During the 2001-2006 period, OIRA led a government-wide effort 
to tighten benefit-cost scrutiny of new unfunded mandates, streamline or 
modernize about 100 existing regulations, and enhance the quality of 
scientific information and analysis used and disseminated by the federal 
government.  It is too early to assess the long-term impacts of this effort on 
the quality of regulation and governmental information.  However, the 
early indications are that the effort has slowed the growth of costly new 
federal rules (compared to previous Administrations) while permitting—
and indeed encouraging—rules with benefits that justify their costs.  As a 
result, the benefit-cost performance of federal regulators has improved. 
The future challenges that remain in regulatory policy are considerable.  
The sea of existing federal regulations needs to be rationalized.  A more 
systematic process for developing and reviewing homeland security rules 
needs to be established.  Finally, the United States and the European Union 
need to do a better job of coordinating their regulatory programs. 
 
 
216 Meeting Agenda, U.S.-E.U. Dialogue on Regulatory Reform (Sept. 28-30, 
2005), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Europe/US_EU_
Regulatory_Cooperation/asset_upload_file32_9163.pdf.   
217 Meeting Agenda, E.U.-U.S. Conference on Good Regulatory Practices, 
Brussels, (Jan. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Europe/US_EU_
Regulatory_Cooperation/asset_upload_file229_9166.pdf. 
 218. See Fact Sheet: U.S.—E.U. Summit: Continuing Our Cooperation to Expand 
Transatlantic Trade (May 7, 2001),  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-12.html. 
